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I. INTRODUCTION
Divorce reform and gender roles are inextricably linked. When Le-
nore Weitzman chronicled the devastating consequences of divorce for
most women, she described a legal system that, in an effort to be gender
neutral in a formal sense, made no allowance for the domestic role
women continue to perform.1 Herma Hill Kay, in reviewing Weitzman-
inspired proposals to expand the scope of the financial awards made at
divorce, nonetheless warned against encouraging "future couples enter-
ing marriage to make choices that will be economically disabling for
women, thereby perpetuating their traditional financial dependence
upon men and contributing to their inequality with men at divorce."2
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; A.B., Princeton University, 1975; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1978. The Author would like to thank Carol Sanger, Dinah Shelton, and Bob
Palmer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, Mitch Polinsky for his advice
on economic terminology, and Lois Yoshida for her assistance in preparing this Article for
publication.
1. See L. WrrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CON-
SEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15-51 (1985).
2. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56
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Feminist writers, led by Martha Fineman, decry the poverty of the ex-
isting debate, focusing as it does on woman either "as equal" or "as
victim" without recognition of the possibility that women could per-
form without penalty a role that differs from the male model of work
force participation.3 Despite the centrality of these concerns to any
modern system of divorce, Ira Ellman sets forth what he terms The
Theory of Alimony without acknowledging that the debate exists. 4
Ellman's theory draws on efficiency principles to argue that ali-
mony should be designed to encourage specialization,5 with the lower
earning spouse-today most often the wife, according to Ell-
man-spending more time on the couple's joint domestic needs so that
the higher earning spouse is able to maximize his or her income.6 He
would then tie alimony awards to the lower earning spouse's proof of
earning capacity lost for the benefit of the other spouse. Ellman con-
cludes that this "is consistent with the movement toward gender equal-
ity, as long as marital roles are not assigned on the basis of gender."'7
Despite his use of the gender neutral language of efficiency, Ell-
man's thesis rests on the premise that women should specialize in do-
U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 80 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change,
A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 789, 814; O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEw ENG.
L. REv. 437 (1988).
4. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAiF. L. REv. 1 (1989). Alimony owes it origins to a
time when the courts did not recognize true divorce but only separation from bed and board. At
that time, alimony was a continuation of the husband's (and only the husband's) legal duty of
support, a duty that was not discharged because the marriage had not been terminated. Professor
Mary O'Connell argues that alimony in this traditional sense, therefore, became obsolete once the
courts willingly recognized divorce a vinculo. See O'Connell, supra note 3, at 456; see also Brinig &
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 Tun. L. REv. 855, 858-65 (1988).
O'Connell, like Ellman, nonetheless uses the term "alimony" to describe modern divorce awards.
O'Connell, supra note 3, at 456.
In order to remain consistent with the terminology Ira Ellman employs, and for lack of a
better word, "alimony" is used throughout this Article to describe payments from one spouse to
another upon divorce that are not considered part of the property division. See Ellman, supra, at
10 n.20. At the end of the Article, I argue that these payments should be seen as simply another
form of property division and that the terms "alimony," "spousal support," and "maintenance" all
should be abolished from the lexicon. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. In the meantime,
however, the word alimony will be used for the sake of simplicity.
5. Ellman observes:
Whenever spouses have different earning capacities and want to plan rationally as a sin-
gle economic unit, they will conclude that, where possible, they should shift economic sacri-
fices from the higher earning spouse to the lower earning spouse, because that shift will
increase the income of the marital unit as a whole. If they follow that plan, the lower earning
spouse (today most likely the wife) will often be pushed toward the position of the wife in the
traditional marriage, even if they had started out with a different intention.
Ellman, supra note 4, at 46.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. at 48 n.141.
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mestic matters to the extent they earn less than their husbands,
without recognition that women earn less than men because they have
historically borne the major childrearing role. Although Ellman claims
that he wishes only to remove "distorting incentives" that discourage
"the kind of marital behavior we want,"" he fails to recognize that even
economists concede that the type of marital behavior "we" want turns
on something more than a desire to maximize the couple's income or
utility.9 A decision to increase specialization within marriage by increas-
ing women's economic dependence on their husbands will ratify existing
gender inequalities, and such a decision cannot depend solely on the
desire to remove distorting incentives.
Ellman's conclusion, moreover, cannot be defended on the effi-
ciency grounds he develops. In The Theory of Alimony Ellman argues
for greater specialization between husbands and wives without examin-
ing its impact on the specialization among women. While men, particu-
larly middle-class men, have assumed increasingly specialized roles over
the course of the last century, women, whether college graduates or
high school dropouts, were limited to the largely undifferentiated role
of homemaker.' 0 The dramatic change in the latter part of the twenti-
eth century has not been, as Ellman claims, a decreasing specialization
within the family because men have assumed only a slightly greater
share of domestic responsibilities than they did before. Rather, the ma-
jor shift has been an increasing specialization among women as married
8. Id. at 50, 52. Ellman considers what would happen if the couple "rejects this 'rational'
choice of maximizing the marital income, perhaps because the wife insists upon it in order to lower
the potential loss she would incur if they ultimately divorce." Id. at 47. He concludes:
Because this marriage is less profitable than a more traditional marriage, some parties
might choose not to enter it in the first place, even though they would enter a traditional
marriage. The restructuring not only reduces total marital income, a loss which the parties
presumably share equally, but also reduces the income of the higher earning spouse. Today,
men are especially likely to be deterred, given the earnings advantage they currently have
over their wives. The man's personal loss is likely to leave residual effects on his earning
capacity that will survive the marriage, if it fails. It also seems likely that more of these
marriages will end in divorce since, other things being equal, the level of satisfaction in such
marriages will be lower. So for both parties, but especially for men, this restructured marriage
offers a lower return and a higher risk.
Id. at 47-48 (footnote omitted).
9. Although Ellman purports to maximize utility rather than income, see id. at 47 n.140, 50-
51, his emphasis on the couple's financial gains from specialization belie that claim. See id. at 46-
48. Even if one were to concede for purposes of discussion that Ellman's proposals were based on
utility maximization, the issue still needs to be framed in broader terms than the couple's interests
alone. See X. POLINSKY. AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcs 25-36 (1983); infra text accom-
panying notes 106-17.
10. Although working-class women often worked outside the home during this period, they
continued to perform the homemaker role as well, and their work force participation was generally
limited to less skilled positions. For a discussion of changes in the work force, see sources cited
infra notes 112 & 115.
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women perform more diversified roles and hire other women to help
care for their homes and their children.11 The same economic analysis
that would support specialization within the family supports specializa-
tion among women, and no rigorous argument can justify one without
examination of the effect on the other.
Despite these limitations, Ellman's proposals merit serious consid-
eration largely because they bear only a tenuous relationship to the ra-
tionale he advances to support them. Ellman's rationale, the desire to
deter inefficient divorce and encourage reliance over the life of the mar-
riage, is the classic justification for expectation damages.12 Elisabeth
Landes, embracing a call for specialization similar to Ellman's, recog-
nized that the gains Ellman claims for his theory could come only from
a contract-like system that enforced marital obligations by tying the
financial consequences of divorce to a determination of which party
bore responsibility for the breakup of the marriage.13 Ellman, in con-
trast, rejects the possibility of defining marital obligations, and his pro-
posals, although dressed in the language of reliance, reinvent alimony as
a form of restitution. Standard economic analysis, however, demon-
strates that restitution, under its own or any other name, will not
achieve the objectives of The Theory of Alimony.
An argument, nonetheless, can be made for Ellman's proposals, but
it is quite different from the one he advances. Restitution is an attrac-
tive basis for the financial allocations made at divorce because, as Ell-
man recognizes, the principle of compensation for benefits conferred at
the other party's expense is powerful. With increasing calls for reevalu-
ation of the marital obligations that survive divorce, restitution pro-
vides a way to recognize the contributions married couples are
continuing to make, without a return to fault or to lifelong separation of
home and market. Although a comprehensive rationale has yet to be
articulated, Ellman's proposals describe, at least in broad outline, the
modern trend in divorce decisions. To realize the promise restitution
offers, however, Ellman and those jurisdictions that would adopt his
proposals need to have a clearer vision of the relationship between men
and women and between home and market that they wish to encourage.
In an effort to clarify the role restitution principles can play in
redesigning divorce awards, this Article provides a critique of The The-
11. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
12. Classic in the sense that those interests are the ones that L.L. Fuller and William R.
Perdue set forth in their original effort to justify expectation damages. See Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936). Modem econo-
mists, however, have a somewhat different view of these interests. See infra notes 48 & 98-101 and
accompanying text.
13. See Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978).
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ory of Alimony, arguing that the theory can be justified only by a con-
clusion that married women should be encouraged to remain in the
work force and continue to bear the primary responsibility for chil-
drearing. 14 Part II of the Article discusses the difference between con-
tractual and noncontractual remedies in the context of divorce and
concludes that Ellman's theory, his claims to the contrary notwith-
standing, is a contractual one to the extent that it rests on a desire to
permit the parties to maximize the return they enjoy from marriage.
Part III places The Theory of Alimony within the context of the mod-
ern law of civil obligation by examining the roles of expectation, reli-
ance, and restitution damages. Part IV examines the source of the
inconsistencies in Ellman's theory. This section first observes that even
for commercial contracts, efficiency analysis fails to provide a basis for
choosing between expectation and restitution; and, second, observes
that for marriage, the desire to maximize the couple's investment pro-
vides, at best, an incomplete basis for analysis. Part IV concludes that a
choice of restitution over expectation or reliance makes sense only to
the extent that deterring divorce is less important than deterring over-
14. Within academic circles, Joan Krauskopf has long advocated use of the concept of lost
earning capacity to define the interests that should be protected upon divorce. See, e.g., Kraus-
kopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23
FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989) [hereinafter Krauskopf, Property Division]; Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Dec-
ade of Development, 50 Mo. L. REv. 259, 261-63 (1985); Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L.
REV. 379, 391-95 (1980) [hereinafter Krauskopf, Legal Protection]. Krauskopf has been among the
first to apply the concept of lost earning capacity to define the interests that should be protected
upon divorce. For a discussion of the existing case law recognizing the concept of lost earning
capacity, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 877-82, 887-89, 902-03.
Throughout The Theory of Alimony, Ellman refers to "the lower earning spouse (today most
likely the wife)," recognizing that "[a]lthough most wives now work outside the home, they usually
continue to bear primary responsibility for the couple's domestic needs as well" with the result
that despite a gender neutral law, alimony claims are most often brought by women against men
and the wife rather than the husband is economically dependent. Ellman, supra note 4, at 4 n.2,
46. Ellman accordingly notes that "[r]ecognizing this reality, and to avoid tedious language, I often
use the term 'wife' and its referent pronoun 'her' as a pronoun for a spouse with an alimony
claim." Id. at 4 n.2.
Elliman's assumptions are disturbing, not because they are wrong, but because he fails to ad-
dress the forces producing gender differences and to evaluate the impact his proposals will have in
perpetuating those differences. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. Nonetheless, because my
primary purpose is to provide a critique of Elman's proposals as a form of civil obligation, I do not
address these assumptions until near the end of this Article. Even then, ironically, I believe that
the type of restitution system Ellman proposes, if conceptualized in somewhat different terms,
may provide a basis for transforming women's status within marriage in a manner more consistent
with a feminist perspective. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67. Accordingly, while I have
problems with Eliman's conclusion that women should continue to bear the primary domestic role
for the reasons given in The Theory of Alimony, this critique proceeds, at least at the outset, on
Ellman's terms, treating the wife as the "lower earning spouse" and examining the consequences
that flow from that assumption.
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reliance, which in this context means discouraging married women from
devoting too much of their energies to the home rather than the mar-
ket. A choice of restitution over need, on the other hand, makes sense
in exactly the manner Ellman describes: as a way of encouraging mar-
ried women to continue to bear the primary responsibility for childrear-
ing and for compromise when two careers clash. Accordingly, the case
for restitution does not depend, as Ellman claims, on the difficulty of
determining when marital obligations have been breached or of calcu-
lating the more expansive measures available from expectation or reli-
ance. Finally, the Article concludes that for reasons other than those
advanced in The Theory of Alimony, restitution, because it focuses on
the benefits that survive the divorce rather than on the events that took
place during the marriage, offers a basis for reconceptualizing divorce
settlements.
II. THE JUSTIFICATION ELLMAN ADVANCES FOR His THEORY Is A
CONTRACTUAL ONE
The core of the modern debate over marriage is the tension be-
tween marriage as a relationship growing out of the agreement of the
parties and as a status imposed by the state in order to advance a larger
set of societal interests. 15 Which gives the union its legitimacy: The
couple's vows to each other or the blessing of the state? Which defines
marital obligations: The intentions of the parties or the duties imposed
by law? Which individual agreements shall be enforced: Those fairly
agreed to or only those that do not contradict societally dictated
conventions?
The traditional answer was unequivocal. Marriage was a status, ca-
pable of formation and dissolution only with state sanction. 16 The state
supplied the status's essential terms, and the couple was powerless to
alter any but the most inconsequential of them." The family, an often
hierarchical and sometimes involuntary relationship charged with a ma-
jor role in administering wealth, determining social standing, and pro-
viding for the care of dependents, was simply too important to be left to
15. This debate is argued no less now than at the time Sir Henry Maine wrote in 1864. See
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163-65 (1864).
16. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV.
663 (1976).
17. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOmEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 2.8-2.15 (1968)
(providing examples of state-imposed restrictions); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A
New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Temple, Freedom of Contract and Inti-
mate Relationships, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 124-25 (1985); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of
Marriage: Tradition and Change, A Proposal for Individual Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62
CALI. L. REv. 1169, 1170 (1974); cf. Glendon, supra note 16, at 663.
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the wishes of its members.18
The modern answer is equivocal. With employment replacing in-
herited wealth as the major determinant of social standing, family law
now emphasizes "[i]ndividual liberty and the relative independence and
equality of family members."'19 The courts have imposed liability with-
out marriage and have absolved former spouses of responsibility for the
events within marriage.2 0 Partly in response, feminists have encouraged
women to devise their own agreements to replace antiquated or unfa-
vorable legal provisions.2 Virtually all scholars decry the older opposi-
tion to such agreements, and recent decisions indicate a greater judicial
willingness to enforce them.2 2 But recognition of a larger ambit for indi-
vidual agreement within and without marriage does not mean that pri-
vate agreement has replaced public prescription as the primary source
of marital obligation. As long as the family remains the major source of
provision for children, the state is unlikely to treat family matters as
exclusively private affairs.2 The choice between status and contract
remains.
In formulating a theory of alimony, Ellman elects a noncontractual
over a contractual approach without confronting these issues. He ob-
serves only that express marital agreements are rare, that implied
agreements are difficult to prove, and to the extent courts are in-
structed to base their decisions on the intentions of the parties, that
they "will be tempted to impose their own beliefs about appropriate
marital conduct under the guise of implying an agreement."24 Ellman
proposes a noncontractual approach so that he can address directly
what the rules governing divorce should be, without the pretense that
such rules necessarily reflect the intention of the parties.25 In the pro-
cess, he misses much of what separates modern contractual and non-
18. For a discussion of the relationship between the family and the administration of wealth
within society, see M. GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981). For a discussion
of the historical treatment of the family, see J. FLANDRIN, FAmiLIES IN FORMER TIMEs (1979).
19. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 41.
20. See M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 63-111 (1987); Glendon, supra
note 16, at 663; Temple, supra note 17, at 136-39.
21. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981); Shultz, supra note 17, at 204.
22. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 207-11 & nn.3-4; Weitzman, supra note 17, at 1170-71.
23. See generally Temple, supra note 17, at 121.
24. Ellman, supra note 4, at 21.
25. Ellman summarizes the difference between contractual and noncontractual approaches as
follows:
The theory offered here is fundamentally different from contract analysis. To think of
alimony in contract terms is essentially to look backwards: We ask what deals were made and
what promises were relied upon, and we fashion a remedy that vindicates reliance on those
promises. By contrast the proposed approach looks forward; it generates alimony rules that
encourage the kind of marital behavior we want.
Id. at 51-52. But see M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 27; see also infra note 45.
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contractual analysis.
Many modern contracts involve situations in which the agreement
between the parties is a vague, relatively undefined relationship. Em-
ployment relationships, franchise agreements, and contract negotiations
all give rise to contractual liability without any clearer agreement than
that which governs marriage.26 Even relatively detailed contracts fre-
quently fail to specify remedies in the event of default. Contract law
fills in the gaps in these agreements by supplying a set of default rules
that govern when the parties fail to make provisions of their own.2 7 Un-
certainty and risk of personal bias increase the need for a clearly articu-
lated set of default rules; they do not mandate a noncontractual
approach. Rather, the difference between contract and noncontract
turns on two other considerations: first, to what degree do the rules re-
flect the interests of the parties to the agreement as opposed to societal
or third-party interests, and, second, to what degree will the parties be
allowed to opt out of the rules?2
In providing for default rules to govern those situations in which
the parties have failed to specify agreements on their own, there is no
way to know, of course, what provisions the parties would have supplied
had they considered the matter. Law and economics scholars solve the
problem by assuming that the parties would agree to any terms that
maximize their joint return from the contract, that is, that make both
parties better off.29 Mitch Polinsky observes that "this approach is
26. Indeed, marriage, which for many still involves the traditional exchange of vows to re-
main married "for better or for worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do
us part," is considerably more definite in its terms than employment relationships, which often
involve no express agreements at all. Yet, modern courts have had little difficulty extending con-
tractual liability to the employment setting. See M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 151-70.
27. M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 25.
28. See Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy
Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 586 (1988). Economists describe these concerns in terms of
externalities. When Mitch Polinsky describes the role of contract law in supplying default rules to
govern particular transactions, he assumes that no one other than the parties are affected by the
contract, and that the appropriate purpose of contract law is to supply the result the parties most
likely would have reached on their own, i.e., the result that maximizes their joint interests. See M.
POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 25. It also follows that the parties should be allowed to opt out of the
default rules set to the extent that they conclude that they would be better off with an alternative
set of rules.
At the point at which other interests become involved, there is no basis for a conclusion that
default rules should maximize the parties' interests, as opposed to third-party or societal interests,
and to the extent default rules are designed to address those other interests, it would be inconsis-
tent to allow the parties to opt out of the rules set. Once legal rules are designed to advance
interests other than those of the parties to the contract, the legal basis for the rules no longer can
be purely contractual because it is rooted in a source of legal obligation other than the agreement
of the parties. Carbone, supra, at 586.
29. M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 25. "The distinction between tort and contract is well
grounded in common law, and divergent objectives underlie the remedies created in the two areas.
1470 [Vol. 43:1463
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equivalent to designing contract law according to the efficiency crite-
rion."30 The approach remains contractual as long as alimony, or any
other default rule, is justified in terms of its ability to maximize the
contracting parties' welfare. Use of efficiency analysis becomes noncon-
tractual only when third-party or societal interests, such as concern for
children, are allowed to override the interests of the couple. 31
In designing his noncontractual theory of alimony, Ellman relies on
efficiency analysis to propose a set of rules that will increase the
couple's return from marriage and "maximize . . the parties' freedom
to shape their marriage in accordance with their nonfinancial prefer-
ences." 32 He makes no effort to determine whether consideration of
children's interests or societal interests would dictate different out-
comes.33 Accordingly, to the extent he addresses only the couple's inter-
ests and leaves open the possibility that they may vary the terms,34 his
theory of alimony is very much a contractual one.
III. ALIMONY IN ELLMAN'S THEORY IS A FORM OF RESTITUTION
The label used, contractual or noncontractual, matters in itself only
when the interests of the couple are at odds with the interests of their
children or society generally.3 5 Ellman does not undertake such an in-
quiry, and even if he were to do so, he possibly would find the other
interests too indeterminate to affect his recommendations. Ellman,
nonetheless, uses the conclusion that his approach is noncontractual to
justify his decision to discuss alimony only in terms of noncontractual
Whereas contract actions are created to enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement, tort
law is primarily designed to vindicate 'social policy.'" Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 (1988) (citation omitted).
30. M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 25. Polinsky notes:
The statement that the parties would have maximized their joint benefits net of their joint
costs obviously presumes that they would have bargained cooperatively. Also, the conclusion
that the maximization of the parties' joint benefits net of their joint costs is the goal of effi-
ciency presumes that no one else is affected by the contract.
Id. at 25 n.16.
31. See Carbone, supra note 28, at 586-88; see also supra note 29.
32. Ellman, supra note 4, at 47-48, 50-51 (footnote omitted).
33. Eilman bases much of his analysis on the conclusion that most couples will be able to
maximize their incomes only if the "lower earning spouse (today most likely the wife)" sacrifices
her career prospects in order to further those of her husband. Id. at 46-48. Although Ellman con-
siders nonfinancial forms of utility such as the wife's psychic gain from doing less housework, id. at
47 n.140, he does not consider third-party interests such as the possibility that the benefits to the
children from the involvement of both parents in their upbringing might offset any financial gain
from their father's specialization in the market, or that societal gains from the changing status of
women might offset financial gains possible from women's specialization in the home. See infra
note 105.
34. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 64-65.
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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remedies. The result is unfortunate because Ellman makes a classic case
for expectation damages in order to advance a restitution approach, all
under the rubric of reliance. His failure to examine the differences be-
tween the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests"6 makes it dif-
ficult to untangle the technical issues from the substantive ones at the
heart of his theory.
In examining remedies on the basis of efficiency, contract provides
the most complete analysis because contract permits consideration of
expectation damages, and only expectation damages provide the advan-
tages Ellman claims for his theory. In attempting to craft a modern
justification for alimony, Ellman first observes that the primary pur-
pose of marriage law ought to be to "encourage the durability of the
relationship." 7 To the extent that "divorce law leaves losses where they
fall," it will encourage divorce.- s Second, Ellman notes that married
couples can increase the benefits they receive from marriage through
specialization-women in the home and men in the market-but only if
their respective investments are protected upon divorce. Without such
protection, the results will be distorted, making marriage less
profitable.3 9
The need to deter divorce (that is, to deter inefficient breach of
marital obligations) and encourage specialization (that is, to encourage
surplus enhancing reliance) is the same justification L.L. Fuller and
William R. Perdue ° gave in 1936 for the use of expectation as the stan-
dard measure of contract damages.4 Like Ellman, Fuller and Perdue
36. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines remedies in accordance with their ability
to serve the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract not been made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
37. Ellman, supra note 4, at 41.
38. Id. at 50.
39. Ellman notes:
[O]ther spouses, who might otherwise adopt suboptimal marital patterns in order to reduce
the magnitude of their potential loss in earning capacity, might not do so if they know the law
will reallocate some of their loss in the event of divorce. These spouses are for the most part
wives.
Id.
40. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 52, 373.
41. Ellman's description of the incentives to divorce, see Ellman, supra note 4, at 50, almost
exactly parallels Richard Posner's conception of efficient breach of contract. See R. PoshzR, Eco-
NOMIC ANAYsis OF LAw 90 (2d ed. 1977). Robert Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg use the term "sur-
plus enhancing reliance" to describe additional investments, undertaken after the contract is
[Vol. 43:14631472
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set out to justify the role of a remedy-expectation damages-and like
EUman, they were heavily influenced by the opportunity cost analysis
popular with economists of their day.42 Fuller and Perdue observed
that, in a market economy, expectation, the contract measure of dam-
ages, and reliance, the tort measure of damages, would converge. Thus,
a complete measure of reliance would include not only out-of-pocket
expenditures, but also the lost opportunities to profit from other con-
tracts; and competition would keep the profits from such alternative
contracts roughly equal to the profits from the contract at hand.43
Given the difficulty of calculating those lost opportunities, Fuller and
Perdue argued that the only way to compensate for this reliance was to
"dispense with its proof"44 and that the reasons for doing so were to
encourage contract compliance45 and reliance over the course of the
contract." Modern economists go even further, arguing that even when
expectation and reliance diverge, expectation best serves the purpose of
discouraging inefficient breach of contract.47
finalized, that increase the return from the contract. Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of
Contract, 73 CALm L. REV. 1432, 1465 (1985). Polinsky gives the example of a buyer of widgets
able to buy custom designed equipment that will make the widgets more valuable. The equipment
is useless for other purposes, and the buyer will make the investment only if she is convinced that
the contract to deliver the widgets as promised will be performed. M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at
29-32.
42. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 56 n.7, 59 n.10 (citing E. DURKHEIM, ON THE
Dr SION or LABOR IN SocmTy 394 (1934) and A. SCHLOSSMANN, DER VERTAG § 37 (1876)). For a
recent discussion of Fuller and Perdue's use of opportunity cost theory, see Katz, Reflections on
Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework,
21 J.L. REFORM 541 (1988).
43. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 55-56, 60-63.
44. Id. at 62.
45. Id. at 60-63. The policy recommendations are normative and not positive, in part, be-
cause the equation between expectation and reliance is an inherently circular one. The benefits
from the contract at hand will approximate the benefits from the contracts foregone only (1) in a
competitive market in which competition keeps the prices of various alternatives close to each
other, and (2) when breach is rare. To the extent that the alternative contracts are also likely to be
breached, their value, measured by the expected profit discounted by the probability of breach,
would be less than the expectation measure, expressed in terms of expected profit from the con-
tract at hand. At the same time, however, the frequency of breach would in turn depend on the
measure of damages, with expectation a more effective deterrent than any lesser measure. In short,
expectation will approximate reliance only if breach is rare, and breach is likely to be rare only if
expectation and not reliance is used as the measure of damages. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note
41, at 1445-49. Fuller and Perdue broke the cycle by arguing that expectation should be justified
only as an incentive to encourage future behavior and not as compensation for what occurred in
the past. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 60-63; cf. Ellman, supra note 4, at 51-52. Accordingly,
the use of expectation damages depends on a decision to encourage contract compliance.
46. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 60-63. Modern economists note, however, that expec-
tation will encourage overreliance, not efficient reliance. For a more rigorous economic treatment of
these issues, see Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1465-68.
47. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 31-34; R. POSNER, supra note 41, at 142-43;
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1462-64.
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Despite the conclusion of contract scholars that expectation, not
reliance or restitution, best serves the twin goals of deterring inefficient
breach (divorce) and encouraging reliance (specialization in homemak-
ing),4" Ellman did not consider an expectation measure of alimony. Yet,
an expectation measure in marriage would resemble the traditional ali-
mony standard-support permitting the lower earning spouse to con-
tinue to enjoy the standard of living made possible by the marriage.4 9
The traditional standard at its worst is no more difficult to calculate
than the lost career opportunity standard Ellman proposes in its stead,
and the traditional standard remains good law in theory, if not in prac-
tice, in most jurisdictions.50
One must assume that Ellman rejected the expectation measure be-
cause it is a contract measure and, therefore, must be tied to a determi-
nation of breach of promise.5' If so, he is right about the connection to
breach. Expectation is a victim-oriented measure. It looks only at the
nonbreaching party's loss and imposes that loss on the wrongdoer. 52 An
48. Even in traditional contracts, these are not, of course, the only concerns. For a discussion
of the importance of deterring overreliance, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
49. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 887 n.132 and cases cited therein.
50. See id.
51. Ellman claims to reject contract because there is no way to determine the agreement
between the parties. Ellman, supra note 4, at 32-33. As explained above, however, contract does
not depend on the existence of a detailed agreement. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
The Theory of Alimony can be read as an effort to supply a set of default rules, including a rule
that the parties are free to divorce at any time for any reason, that will govern in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. When Ellman concludes
that contract will not work, he is really saying that he is unwilling to imply a commitment to
remain married. See infra note 54.
Ellman, nonetheless, does consider the possibility of treating alimony as a form of damages for
breach of contract. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 23-24. He does not subject this possibility to the
type of efficiency analysis he uses for his own proposals, however. He also concludes, erroneously I
believe, that a contract system necessarily would deny alimony to parties whose conduct was found
to be the proximate cause of the divorce. See id. at 23. There is, in fact, no reason why a contract
system could not coexist with a restitution system. For example, a building contractor found to be
in breach of a contract to complete an office building still could offset a claim to be paid for
services performed against any expectation award owed the owner. For an explanation of how this
would work in marriage, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 886-87, 899-901.
52. Ellman notes that "fault, as the term is used in these divorce cases, is generally limited to
intentional or negligent conduct. Under contract law, however, one can be in breach even where
the breach was neither negligent nor intentional." Ellman, supra note 4, at 24 (footnote omitted).
While this statement may be an accurate definition of the difference between contract and tort,
the difference it makes in the context of marriage is unclear. Breach of the marriage contract
presumably refers to a decision to end a marriage when that decision is not justified by sufficiently
egregious conduct by the other spouse. See infra note 54. Fault in traditional divorce cases has
been defined in terms of desertion, adultery, or extreme cruelty, i.e., in terms of conduct suffi-
ciently egregious to justify termination of the marriage. See, e.g., 2 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES
ON MARRIAGE, DiVORCE AND SEPARATION § 469, at 213 (1891); Neuner, Modern Divorce Law-The
Compromise Solution, 28 IowA L. REv. 272, 276 (1943); Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Back-
ground of Alimony Law and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197-
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expectation measure says in effect that the party to be compensated is
entitled to continue to enjoy, at the other's expense, the standard of
living made possible by the marriage.5s To justify this conclusion, there
must be a reason to believe that the marriage should have endured,
such as an enforceable promise to remain married until "death do us
part," and some reason to impose responsibility for the marriage's fail-
ure on the paying party. 4 If there is no obligation to remain married or
no way to determine which party disappointed the other's expectation
that the marriage would continue, expectation damages make no
sense. 5
98 & n.5 (1939). Employing breach of contract concepts would not change the nature of the deter-
mination. The definition of conduct sufficiently egregious to justify termination of marriage, how-
ever, would have to be modernized, eliminating the double standard for adultery, redefining
cruelty, and emphasizing a pattern of conduct rather than a single immoral act. See infra note 144.
The more important difference between the older concept of fault and a modern definition of
breach of marital obligations would be the degree of opprobrium attached to the determination. A
finding of fault always has implied moral condemnation of blameworthy conduct with implications
for nonfinancial consequences of the dissolution, particularly child custody. See O'Connell, supra
note 3, at 468 n.178. Breach of contract need not involve any such disapproval. Indeed, advocates
of efficient breach argue that there are circumstances in which the parties should be encouraged to
breach contractual obligations, the only limitation being a willingness to pay for damages inflicted
as a result of their breach. See R. POSNER, supra note 41, at 55-58; cf. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW, 299-303 (1881). It is possible to imagine a divorce system in which the parties are free to seek
a divorce, with no express or implied condemnation of that decision, and at the same time, the
party choosing to end the marriage will be required to compensate the other for the consequences
of that action.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) (defining expectation interest).
54. Legally, marital vows continue to involve a lifetime commitment. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); Krauskopf & Thomas, Part-
nership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 558, 558 (1974). Accordingly, an expectation measure of damages would look to the benefits
the parties would have realized had there been no breach of marital obligations, i.e., if the mar-
riage had endured for a lifetime.
Within this context, breach would mean an unexcused decision to end a marriage. The deci-
sion could be justified only by conduct of the other spouse incompatible with the continuation of
the marriage; the decision to seek a divorce would be justified if the other spouse breached his or
her marital obligations first, giving the nonbreaching spouse the right to call the marriage to an
end. Unlike the older fault standard, a finding that marital obligations had been breached would
not be a prerequisite for a divorce. Rather, the courts applying such a standard would be allowed
to consider the reasons for the divorce in determining the financial allocations to be made, in much
the same way that a court considers breach of contract allegations in administering the dissolution
of a partnership. California and a number of other states preclude consideration of marital miscon-
duct in any form. .ee Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 887-88 n.132 and the states cited therein;
Kay, supra note 2, at 72-74 n.363 and the states cited therein. Some states that recognize no-fault
divorce, however, permit consideration of marital misconduct to influence the resulting awards.
For a list of states that do so, see I. ELLMAN, P. KuRTz & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 265-76 (1986); Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 886-87 n.129; Kay, supra note 2, at
72-74 n.363.
When Ellman concludes that a contract model will not work, he is saying in effect that the
promise to remain married is unenforceable. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 24.
55. This is true in part because of the impossibility of protecting both parties' expectation
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1463
Ellman's mistake is in assuming that by labeling his remedy non-
contractual, he automatically circumvents a determination that marital
obligations have been breached. 6 If expectation is the quintessential
contract remedy, reliance is the quintessential tort remedy; 7 and reli-
ance, whether or not in the form of the lost career opportunities Ellman
seeks to compensate, is just as victim oriented as expectation. 8 As a
measure of damages, reliance says in effect that one party must pay for
the other's loss, whether or not the paying party has suffered corre-
sponding losses or gains of his own."s Fault is the traditional justifica-
tion for such an obligation to pay, that is, a conclusion that the paying
party wrongfully caused the other party's loss." Changing the name of
the remedy from contractual to noncontractual, from expectation to re-
liance, and from the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to
compensation for lost earning potential, therefore, does nothing to elim-
inate a determination of wrongdoing or the difficulties involved in iden-
tifying the duty that has been breached.
Nomenclature aside, there are only two ways to abolish considera-
tion of marital misconduct and still provide for an expansive definition
of alimony. The first method expands the partnership concept to imply
an agreement between the parties not only to share the assets accumu-
lated during the marriage, but also to equalize postdivorce incomes.61
interests. Both parties lose something from the divorce, and one party's interest can be compen-
sated only at the expense of the other. For further discussion of this issue, see Brinig & Carbone,
supra note 4, at 875-76 & n.89.
56. Ellman labels his theory noncontractual and describes it as designed to compensate lost
earning capacity. Ellman, supra note 4, at 50-52. Reliance forms the basis of his proposed solution
because it focuses on the lower earning spouse, comparing "the claimant's economic situation at
the end of the marriage with the situation she would have been in if she had not married." Id. at
53; cf. infra note 59 (defining reliance).
57. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); see also P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
58. See O'Connell, supra note 3, at 468-69 & n.178, 498-99.
59. A reliance measure of damages attempts to put the injured party in the position he would
have been in had he never engaged in the transaction. In a contract setting, this means the posi-
tion the nonbreaching party would have held had there been no contract. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981). In torts, it means the position the injured party would have held had
there been no wrong. D. LAYcocK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 35-45 (1985). Changing the nature
of the allegations from contract to tort, from expectation to reliance, and from fault to promissory
estoppel, however, does not eliminate the requirement of breach of obligation. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (establishing breach of promise as an element of a cause
of action for promissory estoppel).
60. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 469.
61. For examples of such proposals, see Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C.
L. Rxv. 1103 (1989); Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests Upon Divorce, in DivORCE REFORM AT
TE CROSSROADS 130-65 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990); Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-
Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALn". L. REV. 291, 318-19 n.196 (1987).
Consider the following example: An artist marries a school teacher. At the time of their di-
vorce, following 10 years of marriage, the artist earns $15,000 per year and the school teacher earns
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Ellman, however, rejects use of the partnership model because no such
agreement exists between the parties and he sees no reason to imply
consent to such a measure.6 2 Moreover, the equalization of postdivorce
incomes does not satisfy the efficiency criteria that Ellman advances
because compensation would be available independently of
specialization.
The second method to circumvent a determination of marital obli-
gations employs a restitution measure of damages, like Ellman's theory
does, his assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.6 3 Ellman advances
a restitution theory not because it serves the ends of efficiency, for it
does not,64 but because it is the only standard he can justify without
consideration of marital misconduct. Restitution, unlike expectation or
reliance, permits recovery whenever the party to be charged has re-
tained a benefit at the other's expense. 5 While restitution uses the lan-
guage of unjust enrichment, the determination that the enrichment is
unjust is no more than a conclusion that the party retaining the benefit
ought to contribute to the cost necessary to obtain it.66 No determina-
$30,000. They have no children.
Under the Singer proposal, the school teacher would have to pay the artist enough to equalize
their postdivorce standard of living for five years. The school teacher's obligation would be the
same even if the wife is the school teacher and her husband the artist, his earning potential is
greater than it would have been if he had not married the schoolteacher, she did the major part of
the housework during the marriage and her earning potential is lower than it would have been as a
result, and the divorce is occurring because the artist became physically abusive. Singer, supra, at
1117-18.
62. Ellman, supra note 4, at 33-40.
63. See id. at 24-28. Ellman concludes:
The doctrine of restitution thus offers no conceptual framework that explains generally why
postmarriage payments are appropriate in some cases and not in others. Before the doctrine
can be applied coherently, one must first have an established understanding of the social and
economic conventions that ordinarily govern the relationship between the parties, against
which to test claims that there has been an "unjust" enrichment.
Id. at 27. The Theory of Alimony, however, attempts to supply social and economic conventions
that require compensation of lost earning potential when that loss results in a benefit to the other
spouse in the form of children or enhanced income. See infra text accompanying note 137.
64. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
65. For a definition of the restitution interest, see supra note 36; see also RESTATEMENT OF
RESTrrUTION § 150 (1937).
Restitution can be used to describe either a remedy for breach of contract or an independent
cause of action. D. LAYcOCK, supra note 59, at 461. The measure of recovery would be the same in
either case, and the distinction between the two is relatively unimportant for purposes of this
Article. Nonetheless, I would characterize a restitution remedy contractual as used in the early
part of this Article if it can be justified on the grounds of maximizing the couple's, as opposed to a
third party's or societal, welfare and if the couple is free to substitute alternative remedies. For a
discussion of the distinction between contractual and noncontractual liabilities, see supra notes 28-
34 and accompanying text.
66. This is another way of saying that there is no necessary moral stigma to a conclusion that
restitution is owed. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907). For a discus-
sion of the role of restitution in supplying appropriate market incentives, see Levmore, Explaining
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tion of a promise or duty to remain married and no determination of
marital misconduct are necessary. Under existing divorce law, for exam-
ple, if the wife gets to keep the family's thirty thousand dollar sports
car, she is also likely to be assessed responsibility for making the pay-
ments. While the court may assume that during the marriage the par-
ties shared both use of the car and the cost of the payments, the
divorce award ordinarily will assign the remaining cost to the party who
retains the benefit.6 7 The result has no stigma attached to it and no
necessary relationship to the reasons for the breakup of the marriage.
Ellman's theory of alimony, like the allocation of car payments,
mirrors his three-part definition of restitution: (1) the defendant must
have received a cognizable benefit; (2) the benefit must have been con-
ferred at the plaintiff's expense; and (3) the defendant's retention of
the benefit must be unjust."" Ellman's first principle, that "a spouse is
entitled to alimony only when he or she has made a marital investment
resulting in a postmarriage reduction in earning capacity," requires that
the party to receive alimony has suffered a loss. 69 His other two princi-
ples limit recovery of such losses to situations in which the investment
producing the postmarital reduction in income produces either a gain in
marital income (principle two) or children (principle three).70 Ellman's
Rules 2.1 and 2.2 define the circumstances in which he finds retention
of the benefit unjust, such as when the benefit results in increased mar-
ital income or children, but not when the wife sacrifices her career op-
portunities to enhance the standard of living the couple enjoys during
the marriage. 1 The theory in effect encourages women to bear the pri-
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 69, 121-23 (1985).
67. Conversely, if the car were wrecked before the marriage ended, the remaining payments
are more likely to be split. If the car were intact and paid for at the time of divorce, the car would
be offset against other marital assets. For an examination of the application of restitution princi-
ples to marriage, see Krauskopf, Legal Protection, supra note 14, at 386.
68. Ellman, supra note 4, at 24-28.
69. Id. at 53.
70. Id. at 58, 71.
71. In other words, the theory would award alimony any time the couple jointly contributes
to an undertaking during the marriage that only one party will enjoy after the divorce, e.g., medi-
cal degrees, or finance a benefit that both parties will enjoy for a lifetime, e.g., children, through
sacrifices only one party will bear after the divorce. For the application of restitution theory to
professional degrees, see Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other
Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751 (1988); Krauskopf, Property Division, supra note 14, at
260 & n.18; Krauskopf, Legal Protection, supra note 14, at 391-93; Schwartz, Divorce and Earning
Ability, 1982 DEw. CL. REv. 69; see also Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 878 n.97.
When children are involved, on the other hand, the benefit obviously is unquantifiable, so the
award will focus on the extent of the sacrifice necessary to raise children. Most of this discussion
focuses on the concept of human capital and the propriety of reimbursing the sacrificing spouse for
the loss of earning potential. See Beninger & Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in
Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201 (1982); Krauskopf, Property Division, supra
note 14, at 262-66; Krauskopf, Legal Protection, supra note 14, at 381-88; Landes, supra note 13,
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mary responsibility for childrearing and to make the sacrifices neces-
sary to permit their husbands' careers to flourish, 2 without encouraging
them to look to marriage rather than the market as a lifelong source of
support.
Ellman may have chosen to eschew the restitution label in order to
concentrate on the lower earning spouse's loss (reliance) rather than the
other spouse's gain (unjust enrichment). But like many other categories
of restitution, Ellman's theory of alimony permits recovery of losses
only when a corresponding gain at least as great as the loss occurs.73
When a married couple, rational, utility-maximizing adults under effi-
ciency theory, decides to forego the wife's earning potential so that she
can be at home with the children, or decides that one spouse will fi-
nance the other's medical education, they presumably value the gain of
children who are raised by their mother rather than a nanny, or the
doctor's expected income at least as much as they value the lost in-
come. 7 Particularly when the benefit is as intangible as it is with chil-
dren, the sacrificing spouse's lost earning potential may provide the
only possible restitution measure of recovery. As long as the theory per-
mits compensation of losses only when they are no greater than the pre-
sumed benefits, the theory will be a restitution and not a reliance
at 35.
While most commentators treat these two categories as independent justifications for alimony,
see, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 3, at 500-02, they are in fact different aspects of restitution-based
awards. Joan Krauskopf recently summarized the debate, concluding that:
[S]cholarly rhetoric, statutory terminology and appellate holdings and reasoning of the
past twenty years indicate the purpose of court-ordered economic settlement at marriage dis-
solution is to achieve a fair sharing of the benefits and burdens of marriage measurable in
dollars. In other words, the purpose of economic settlement is to assure that, at the conclusion
of the marriage, one party does not suffer unduly while the other gains because of the mar-
riage experience. In order to encourage marriage as the normative mode for loving personal
relationships and for nurturing children, social policy seeks to assure a fair allocation of the
gains and losses when the marriage relationship ends ...
The two primary goals of fairly allocating benefits and burdens due to the marriage are to
achieve a fair sharing of the assets and obligations of the marital partnership and to also
achieve a fair sharing of the personal gains and personal losses either spouse has enjoyed or
suffered because of service to the family created by their marriage.
Krauskopf, Property Division, supra note 14, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted).
72. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 73.
73. Fuller and Perdue in 1936 explained this relationship between reliance and restitution,
arguing that many restitution awards in fact used a reliance measure of recovery and that in the-
ory the ghin to the promisor should approximate the promisee's loss. Fuller & Perdue, supra note
12, at 53-54. For a classic example of restitution using the plaintiff's loss as the measure of recov-
ery, see Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909) (the "Turkish bathhouse case").
74. In discussions regarding this point, Fuller and Perdue have stated that "gains by the
promisor will be accompanied by a corresponding and, so far as its legal measurement is con-
cerned, identical loss to the promisee, so that for our purposes the most workable classification is
one which presupposes in the restitution interest a correlation of promisor's gains and promisee's
loss." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 54-55; see also Katz, supra note 42, at 544-45.
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system.
Ellman's choice of a restitution basis for recovery as a way of cir-
cumventing a determination of marital obligations explains a number of
the anomalies in his theory. First, he is troubled because the theory
does not address what he terms "the gender-based differences in the
remarriage prospects of divorced men and divorced women. 1 75 He sug-
gests that, "[a]lthough some remedy is probably necessary, we may con-
clude that the obligation is society's and not the former husband's."7 6
The reason his theory of alimony cannot compensate for the fact that
men have greater opportunities for remarriage than do their former
wives is that husbands have an obligation to provide compensation to
the extent, and only to the extent, that they breach an obligation to
remain married.77 These expectation losses, unlike lost earning capacity,
do not correspond to a benefit conferred on the paying party, and resti-
tution theory, therefore, provides no basis for compensation. The losses
are real, however, and the type of efficient breach analysis on which the
theory otherwise depends suggests that his failure to compensate for
these losses means that Ellman's theory cannot solve the problem he
describes as "distorting incentives" that encourage divorce. 8
75. Ellman, supra note 4, at 80.
76. Id. at 81.
77. For a discussion of the relationship between lost marital prospects and the expectation
measure of damages, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 873-76, 894-95. To the extent that
young women enjoy many opportunities to marry and those opportunities decline more precip-
itously with age for women than for men, the type of economic analysis on which Ellman relies
suggests that the solution is a long-term contract, i.e., a commitment to remain married until
"death do us part." See Ellman, supra note 4, at 41-44. Gary Becker, the University of Chicago
economist who pioneered the literature on economics of the family, concluded:
Since married women have been specialized to childbearing and other domestic activities,
they have demanded long-term "contracts" from their husbands to protect them against
abandonment and other adversities. Virtually all societies have developed long-term protec-
tions for married women; one can even say that "marriage" is defined by a long-term commit-
ment between a man and a woman.
G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAmLY (1981).
78. Ellman states that "[s]ome spouses who would terminate their marriage under a divorce
law that leaves losses where they fall, would not seek divorce under a law that reallocated those
losses. These spouses are for the most part husbands." Ellman, supra note 4, at 50. This is a
restatement of Posner's theory of efficient breach that requires compensation of expectation losses
to achieve efficient deterrence. See R. POSNER, supra note 41, at 90.
Cooter and Eisenberg explain:
The effect of expectation damages on the promisor's calculations can be stated in terms
of externalities. Economists say that an externality exists when one person imposes a cost
upon another without paying for it. Incentives for performance are efficient if they compel a
promisor to balance the cost to him of performing against the losses to himself and to others
that will result if he does not perform. If the promisor does not perform, the promisee loses
his share of the value of the contract. If the promisor is liable for that loss, he internalizes not
only his own loss but the losses to the promisee that result from his failure to perform. In
contrast, if the promisor is liable only for reliance damages, he will not internalize the full
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Second, Ellman's unwillingness to recognize benefits other than
children or enhanced income is otherwise inexplicable. Ellman argues
that the law should be structured to encourage utility maximization
during marriage, not wealth maximization, and that the couple will fail
to make investments that increase the benefits from marriage if, upon
divorce, those investments are not compensated.79 This reasoning, how-
ever, applies with equal force to financial and nonfinancial benefits. It is
not difficult to posit a traditional, gender-stereotyped marriage in which
the couple derives greater utility from the wife's homemaking services
than from her income, even when there are no children and no enhance-
ment of the husband's career. The wife, however, cannot be expected to
make these utility-enhancing investments unless her sacrifice is pro-
tected in the event of divorce.80 The problem with compensating such
investments cannot be, as Ellman claims, that they are economically
irrational, for to the extent that they in fact maximize the parties' util-
ity, they are quite rational. 81 Rather, the difficulty arises either because
value of performance to the promisee. Thus, expectation damages create efficient incentives
for the promisor's performance, while reliance damages do not, unless they are identical to
expectation damages.
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1463. If Ellman were serious about deterring older men from
running off with younger women and leaving their wives with few prospects for remarriage, he
would propose an expectation system of damages that would enable the wife to enjoy the financial
position she would have had had the marriage continued, whether or not she had suffered a loss of
earning potential. This system would, in Ellman's terms, reallocate the losses imposed by the di-
vorce, requiring the husband to consider the wife's loss as well as his own gains in deciding
whether to seek a divorce. As explained above, however, Ellman can do this only if he recognizes
marriage as a lifelong commitment and ties such an award to a determination that the husband
breached the obligation to remain married. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
79. Ellman, supra note 4, at 49, 50-51. For a debate on the difference between utility max-
imization and wealth maximization, see Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) and Coleman, Efficiency, Util-
ity, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980).
80. Even if Donald and Ivana Trump had not had children, Donald almost certainly would
have valued Ivana's nonfinancial contributions to the marriage more than any income she could
have earned had she pursued a career. Ivana, if she acted rationally, would have weighed the
benefits from those activities against the foregone income. Given her $25 million antenuptial agree-
ment, the marginal value of additional income should have been relatively low even if she took into
account the possibility of divorce. Accordingly, a decision by Donald and Ivana to have her forego
her earning possibilities in order to enhance the couple's lifestyle could have been quite rational,
whether viewed in terms of the couple's joint interests or each spouse's individual interests. For an
excellent discussion of the search for marital partners and the utility for particularly wealthy indi-
viduals of finding a partner who brings noneconomic assets to the marriage, see P. ENGLAND & G.
FARKAs, HoUSEHOLDs, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER 34-36, 182 (1986).
81. Economic rationality extends to any decision designed to maximize utility. See A. AL-
CHUN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: CoiEurmoN, COORDINATION & CONTROL 13, 38 (3d
ed. 1983); M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYs IN PosITVE EcONOM-
icS 34 (1953). A decision for the wife not to work when the result will be to lower the family's
aggregate income may be economically rational but financially irrational. Compare Ellman's dis-
cussion of this issue, supra note 4, at 63-64.
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Ellman does not approve of these couples' lifestyle preferences 82 or be-
cause protection of these intangible benefits 3 comes perilously close to
protecting expectation losses.8 4 Nonetheless, if Ellman were serious
about removing distorting incentives that prevent married couples from
82. Ellman's proposals are far too limited to promote the degree of intrafamily specialization
that he purportedly favors. The more likely explanation for his proposals is a desire to encourage
greater specialization among women and still provide for children and for trade-offs in two-career
families. See infra text accompanying note 140.
83. During the marriage, both parties share the loss of the wife's income and benefit from the
enhanced lifestyle her activities make possible. At divorce, the benefits will disappear while the
wife will continue to suffer a loss in earning potential. In these cases, compensation can be justified
on a restitution basis to the extent the husband enjoyed a benefit during the marriage equal to or
greater than half of his wife's lifetime loss of earnings. The benefit, however, cannot be precisely
calculated. To apply Ellman's lost earning potential measure will require a presumption that the
couple shared the benefits equally and that the couple believed at the time they made the decision
that the benefits (enhanced lifestyle during the marriage) would at least equal the cost (the wife's
lifetime loss of earning potential). This presumption is less automatic than in the case of children
or enhanced careers because there is less societal interest in promoting this particular exchange.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
84. Lost earning potential, the measure of recovery on which Ellman's proposals depend,
always will be problematic given the impossibility of determining the path the lower earning
spouse would have pursued had she not married. This difficulty is compounded because society,
until recently, has encouraged women to look to marriage rather than the market for their financial
well-being. For example, in the case of a woman who marries at 20, drops out of college, works
briefly as a secretary, and then stays home to care for her two children, what is the appropriate
measure of lost earning potential: (1) her income if she had continued working as a secretary; (2)
her income as a college graduate, calculated in accordance with tables that show the income of
female graduates to be substantially lower than that of male graduates; or (3) her income if she
had pursued the opportunities open to a similarly talented male?
To persuade the lower earning spouse to specialize in the home in a way that will have a
lifetime impact on earning potential, Ellman needs a relatively expansive measure of recovery. The
Oregon courts supply an example of such a measure when they assume that divorcing women, but
for their societally encouraged reliance on marriage, would earn enough to enjoy the standard of
living made possible by their spouse's income. See, e.g., Grove v. Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571
P.2d 477, 485 (1977). Using such a standard, the expectation measure (the standard of living en-
joyed during the marriage) is presumed equal to the reliance measure (the lost income potential of
the lower earning spouse), and Ellman's proposals presume in turn that the reliance measure is
equal to the restitution measure (the benefit conferred by the lower earning spouse's contributions
to homemaking).
The more traditional the marriage, however, the less likely these measures are to be equal. In
marriages in which wives look to their husbands' incomes for their financial well-being, irrespective
of the presence of children or of the husbands' career needs, the wives likely have invested more in
the search for attractive marital partners than in their careers. With less career investment, the
benefit from their homemaking efforts need not be so great to persuade them to forego the career
opportunities they do have. For these women, the expectation loss will be considerably greater
than the benefit conferred by their homemaking services; and if an expansive measure of lost in-
come potential is employed, the recovery may become disproportionate to the benefit the paying
spouse enjoyed. This is true because a decision to specialize in homemaking at the expense of other
opportunities is not a decision women make only after they enter a particular marriage. Rather, it
often reflects a lifetime course of conduct in which the most important source of lost income po-
tential will be premarital decisions such as not completing college or not entering management
training programs.
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maximizing their utility, he should recognize this as another benefit.85
Restitution, under any name, offers the possibility of meeting Ell-
man's challenge to supply a rationale for alimony in the age of no-fault
divorce. It also requires that Ellman directly confront the problems that
arise from a restitution approach. One problem is that the older prece-
dents find all services within marriage to be gratuitous.s While the
older cases are distinguishable, convincingly establishing the distinc-
tions requires recognition of the changes in the nature of marriage."7
85. Ellman also mischaracterizes the role of opportunity cost analysis because he fails to
recognize the restitution nature of his proposals. Ellman claims that his compensation of lost in-
come potential is not an opportunity cost measure because he does not offset gains from the other
spouse's income during the marriage against any income lost. Ellman, supra note 4, at 54-55. This
misstates the nature of the transaction. The opportunity cost Ellman describes is not the cost of
acquiring access to the other spouse's income because modern marriages do not ordinarily require
either spouse to forego their earning potential. The lower earning spouse would have enjoyed the
benefits of the marriage even if she made no career sacrifices at all. Rather, these lost income
opportunities are the costs of having children, enhancing the other spouse's career, or enjoying the
lifestyle a full-time homemaker makes possible. Moreover, the fact that the lower earning spouse
may value the benefits she has received (e.g., her children) more than the income potential she
forewent is irrelevant to the need for compensation. Restitution requires only that the other
spouse retain a benefit without paying his full share of the cost, and that cost, under Ellman's
proposals, will be measured by the sacrificing spouse's lost income potential. Despite his protesta-
tions, Ellman's proposals employ a classic lost opportunity cost measure of recovery. For a more
extended discussion of the difference between the opportunity cost of marriage and the opportu-
nity cost of children and other optional benefits, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4.
86. See, e.g., In re Barnet's Estate, 320 Pa. 408, 182 A. 699 (1936); Annotation, Right, on
Annulment of Marriage, to Allowance for Services, 111 A.L.R. 348 (1937); see also Krauskopf,
Legal Protection, supra note 14, at 394 nn.90-91.
87. In the classic case giving restitution a bad name, Husband marries Wife 2 and they live
together for twenty years. Wife 2, who has no outside income of her own, assists her husband in
running his business. Husband dies, leaving a substantial estate entirely in his name. Wife 2 then
discovers that Husband never divorced Wife 1 and that, legally, he is still married to her. Wife 1
will be entitled to dower rights, a forced share of the estate, or whatever other rights are accorded
widows. Wife 2 may be left with nothing. She accordingly claims restitution for services performed
during the putative marriage. The courts rule against her on the ground that her services were
gratuitously rendered. See supra note 86 and sources cited therein. See generally W. WADLINGTON,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS oN DoMEsTic RELATIONS (1984).
While the outcome is obviously unjust, the conclusion that no compensation can be awarded
for services performed during the marriage is correct. In earlier eras, the wife exchanged her dowry
for dower rights, and her services for the husband's support. See Donohue, What Causes Funda-
mental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78
MIcH. L. REV. 59 (1979). If the marriage proved invalid, restitution principles would give her a
right to return of her dowry. See H. CLARK, supra note 17, §§ 3.5, 14.8. The support she received
during the marriage, however, in theory at least, already had compensated her for services per-
formed. Even in modern marriages, recognition of a right to compensation for services performed
during the marriage would give rise to claims for reimbursement for support provided, whether by
the husband or the wife. Restitution can be awarded in these cases only if the courts are willing to
abandon the presumption that both spouses contribute equally to an ongoing marriage and, in-
stead, total up and compare their individual contributions. The solution in the cases of putative
second marriages lies in property and family law reform, not an expansion of restitution claims.
See generally id. §§ 14.6-14.8.
The examples discussed in this Article are distinguishable because they rest not on the princi-
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Ellman may have avoided the restitution label in order to make his pro-
posal easier to sell to the courts.
Another problem with a restitution approach is the intangible na-
ture of the benefit retained. Ellman sidesteps the issue by using lost
earning capacity as the measure of recovery and then limiting recovery
to those cases in which one would expect the benefit at least to equal
the earning capacity lost."" If the restitution basis of these proposals
were made explicit, however, Ellman would have to define more directly
the benefit retained. While focusing on the benefits, however intangible,
has certain advantages, the results of such an analysis are by no means
certain.8 9
ple of compensation for services performed during the marriage, but on the unequal division of
costs and benefits at the time of the divorce. Nonetheless, to use restitution as an explicit basis for
compensation, the courts may need to circumvent the precedents that label all marital contribu-
tions as gratuitously rendered.
88. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
89. There are two main considerations. First, what is the benefit from having had children or
from having children raised by their mother rather than a nanny? If the children are adults at the
time of the divorce, it is easy to assume that any benefit is shared equally by both parents, and
that the couple believed, at the time they decided to have children or to raise them in a particular
way, that the benefits would be worth the income foregone. If, on the other hand, the divorce
occurs when the children are young and the mother is granted custody, is it appropriate to con-
tinue to assume that the parents share the benefits equally? If not, can the earning potential the
mother lost in the interests of childrearing be compensated to the same degree?
The solution to this must be normative rather than positive. It is impossible to know with
certainty the value parents place on their children, although recent literature suggests that women
may place greater value on children than men do. See, e.g., V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR Eco-
NOmiC EQUALITY 71 (1988); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. CHODOROw, THE REPRO-
DUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978). To the extent that
we as a society wish to encourage women to invest in children, or to the extent that we do not wish
women's stronger preference for children to be a source of disadvantage, we will elect a presump-
tion that men and women share equally in those benefits and then use lost earning capacity as a
surrogate measurement.
A second issue concerns professional degrees and other forms of enhanced earnings. Here, the
benefit is more tangible, but the division of that benefit into appropriate shares is not. Suppose, to
take a classic gender-stereotyped case, a woman puts her husband through medical school and they
divorce shortly after graduation. The benefit retained could be calculated either (1) in terms of the
projected earning stream made possible by her contributions less his postdivorce expenses divided
in accordance with their respective contributions (her income and encouragement versus his indus-
try and talents), or (2) in terms of her direct financial contributions plus an appropriate rate of
return. In this case, a 50/50 division of his lifetime earnings is almost certainly inappropriate, and
any other division is likely to be arbitrary. See Krauskopf, Property Division, supra note 14, at
260 n.18, 262 n.26, and sources summarized therein. At the same time, many writers oppose mere
reimbursement of her contributions as inadequate. See, e.g., id. at 262 n.26.
Focusing on the benefit retained, i.e., thinking of recovery in terms of restitution rather than
reliance, does nothing to resolve the question of which method to choose. A possible solution,
however, lies in attempting to equate the wife's interest in the husband's medical degree with an
appropriate return on her investment. Simply reimbursing the wife for her direct financial contri-
bution at a legal or nominal rate of interest is unfair because her investment in the husband's
medical degree was riskier than putting the money into a bank account. Similarly, the market
value of the benefit the husband received is equal to the repayment of a loan that only had to be
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The final and ultimately most serious issue is that acknowledging
the restitution nature of Ellman's proposals underscores, rather than
cures, his failure to supply a rationale capable of justifying them. The
choices Ellman makes-the choice of restitution over expectation and
reliance; protection of contributions to childrearing, but not the quality
of life within the marriage; the decision to encourage women to con-
tinue to specialize in homemaking without encouraging them to rely on
marriage itself for their economic welfare-all are veiled under the un-
satisfying claim that he is merely removing "distorting incentives." In
fact, however, the justifications he supplies-the need to discourage di-
vorce and encourage specialization-are inconsistent with the solution
he advocates. If restitution is to supply the basis for a reinvigorated
system of alimony, the explanation lies outside Ellman's theory.
IV. THE CHOICE OF RESTITUTION: REMAINING IN THE LABOR MARKET
AND RETAINING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREARING
A. The Limits of Efficiency
To the extent that Ellman supplies a justification for his theory, he
does so on the basis of efficiency alone. Although he argues at one point
that divorce law should encourage marriages to endure, the main thrust
of his argument is his call for the removal of distorting incentives.9 0
Presumably this means that to the extent one set of rules produces in-
centives which encourage "the optimal allocation of marital roles and
duties""1 and another does not, the law should impose the rules that
encourage optimal results.92 Ellman fails to acknowledge, however, that
there is no single set of efficient rules.
Since the days of Fuller and Perdue, modern analysts have refined
their analysis of contract damages to argue that only expectation and
not reliance, however broadly defined, can provide efficient incentives
for breach. Economists define efficient breach as breach that makes
repaid if he succeeded as a doctor. The result should be reimbursement calculated at interest rates
that ordinarily will be much higher than the nominal or legal rate. If the rate of return is suffi-
ciently high, it will become equivalent to a share of the degree. As long as a restitution approach is
used, however, the focus should remain on where the parties would have been if they had not
married, not how they would have divided the earnings if the marriage had continued.
In cases in which the husband's enhanced earnings are less easily calculated than the benefits
of a professional degree and the wife's contribution took the form of lost earning potential rather
than a direct financial contribution, that lost earning potential would again become the best meas-
ure of a restitution recovery. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
90. Ellman, supra note 4, at 50.
91. Id. at 49.
92. Optimal is defined "in the sense of maximizing spousal utility if the marriage remains
intact." Id.
93. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 34-35; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at
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some parties better off without making any parties worse off, and they
argue that breach should be encouraged only when the parties' net wel-
fare will be enhanced. 94 To encourage breach only when it will be effi-
cient, these analysts argue for imposing the nonbreaching party's losses
on the breaching party.95 Only then will the breaching party have an
obligation to weigh the advantages to all parties from continuing the
arrangement against the individual advantages from breaching. When
Ellman observes that "[s]ome spouses who would terminate their mar-
riage under a divorce law that leaves losses where they fall, would not
seek divorce under a law that reallocated those losses," '96 he is describ-
ing the economic theory of efficient breach. Economists are uniform in
their conclusion that only an expectation measure of damages, not reli-
ance or restitution, can remove the "distorting incentives" that en-
courage divorce.9 7
Economists also argue, however, that only restitution, not expecta-
tion or reliance, can supply efficient incentives for reliance over the
1462-64; Katz, supra note 42, at 558 (stating that the conventional law and economics theory is
that optimal contract damages only incidentally protect the reliance interest).
94. See, e.g., M. POLNSKY, supra note 9, at 29-34; R. POSNER, supra note 41, at 90.
95. Mitch Polinsky gives the following example: Suppose Seller agrees to supply Buyer with
a widget for $175, payable in advance. Buyer 1 expects to realize a $25 profit from the widget and
spends $10 in preparation for delivery. Buyer 2 also would like the widget and offers to buy it from
Seller.
Suppose now that Buyer 2 values the widget at $190 and offers that much for it. If Seller is
liable only for the return of the purchase price (restitution damages), Seller then would have an
incentive for breach because the sale would realize an additional $15 dollar profit. If Seller is liable
for reliance damages, he still will have an incentive to breach because he would realize an addi-
tional $5 profit even if he reimburses Buyer 1 for his $10 reliance expenditure as well as return of
the contract price. Only if an expectation measure is used, awarding Buyer 1 $200 in damages
(without breach, Buyer 1 would have a widget he values at $200), would Seller have an incentive to
comply with the contract. In this case, economists argue that breach, i.e., the most likely result of
the restitution and reliance approaches, is inefficient because, while Seller is indifferent between
the two buyers, Buyer 1 values performance more than Buyer 2 does. Breach in favor of Buyer 2
will lower the parties' combined profits. The law, therefore, supplies efficient incentives only when
it forces Seller to take into account the valuo Buyer 1 places on performance. M. POLMNSKY, supra
note 9, at 27-31.
96. Ellman, supra note 4, at 50. He notes further that these spouses are usually husbands. Id.
97. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 31-34; R. POSNER, supra note 41, at 143-44;
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1462-64; Katz, supra note 42, at 558. As noted above, an
expectation measure of damages in divorce would be enough money to permit the lower earning
spouse to continue to enjoy the standard of living made possible by the marriage. See supra note
53 and accompanying text. If the higher earning spouse is seeking the divorce, he or she then
would have to weigh the advantages of the divorce against the cost of maintaining the other
spouse's standard of living. Even if expectation damages were ruled out because the agreement of
the two parties was indeterminate, reliance damages still would be preferable to restitution in
terms of deterring divorce. M. POLiNSKY, supra note 9, at 31. A true reliance theory of alimony
would compensate lost earning potential whenever it occurred in reliance on the marriage, not just
when it resulted in a benefit to the other spouse. The second and third principles of Ellman's
theory accordingly would be inappropriate. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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course of the contract. Precisely because breach will sometimes be effi-
cient, economists argue that surplus enhancing reliance98 should be en-
couraged only when it is justified by the expected return on the
investment discounted by the probability of breach.99 In a case in
which breach may be both efficient and probable, it makes no sense to
encourage investments that will be valueless if the expected event
comes to pass. 00 Restitution, not expectation or reliance, is the only
remedy that can encourage the nonbreaching party to weigh the advan-
tages of the investment against the possibility that the investment will
be rendered worthless by the actions of the other party.'0
Economists conclude that no single efficient solution exists, but
rather that the choice between expectation and reliance turns on which
concern is more important-deterring inefficient breach or deterring
overreliance.10 2 A desire to remove distorting incentives provides no ba-
98. Surplus enhancing reliance is defined in terms of investments made after parties enter
into a contract, which are not required by the contract, but which may increase the return the
parties can realize from the undertaking. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1465.
99. In the case discussed supra at note 95, Buyer 1 may be able to spend $24 on custom
designed equipment that will permit him to earn an additional $30 in profits once the widget
arrives. Because the widgets are perishable, the equipment must be ordered before the widgets are
delivered, but without the widgets, the equipment will be worthless. If breach is likely and only
restitution damages are available, Buyer 1 will not make the expenditure. Under either an expecta-
tion or reliance measure, on the other hand, the buyer will have an incentive to make the invest-
ment even if breach is probable. Economists view surplus enhancing reliance as inefficient
whenever the expected surplus discounted by the probability of breach is less than the cost of the
investment, and they conclude that both expectation and reliance damages encourage inefficient
reliance. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 31-34; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at
1465-67.
100. Within marriage, people normally take such factors into account. Consider these two
real-life examples: (1) Sixteen year old marries 19 year old plumber, drops out of high school, and
has three children within five years. The marriage is rocky from the start. She gets her high school
equivalency diploma and a nursing certificate, explaining that she expects that the marriage even-
tually may fail and she wants to be in a position to support herself and the children when it does.
(2) Partner at a major corporate firm marries another lawyer and has three children in less than
five years. She resigns from the partnership shortly after the birth of the first child in order to stay
home with the children. Her decision to leave the practice of law is based on confidence that the
marriage will last.
101. This is true because restitution, unlike reliance or expectation, provides compensation
only if there is a benefit conferred on the other party. In the case of the widgets described supra at
note 95, no benefit is conferred, and hence, the party making the expenditure has to internalize the
risk that breach will render the investment worthless. See M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 34-37;
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1466; Katz, supra note 42, at 559. For a more rigorous
treatment of these issues, see Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J.
LEGAL STuD. 427 (1983) and Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466 (1980).
102. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 36; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1467-
68 (comparing expectation and reliance damages only); Katz, supra note 42, at 560. Polinsky
concludes:
[I]n general, there does not exist a breach of contract remedy that is efficient with respect
to both the breach decision and the reliance decision. With respect to breach, the expectation
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sis for that choice.
B. The Limits of Contract
Ellman limits his efforts to justify alimony not only to efficiency
considerations, but to the interests of the married couple alone.10 3 His
diagnosis of the problem alimony is designed to solve almost exclusively
is concerned with allowing the couple to maximize their income,0 4 with
a passing reference to the benefits the couple reaps from children and
from the wife's psychic satisfaction from having her husband perform a
larger share of household tasks. 105 Altogether missing from the analysis
is any reference to externalities, that is, to a set of societal interests
that goes beyond those of the particular couple.
In discussing the implications of Ellman's theory, even in resolving
the more technical conflict between efficient incentives for breach and
for reliance, the central issue is not the ability of the couple to maxi-
mize their income, but the provisions that we, as a society, wish to
make for childrearing and for the relationship between men and
women. 06 Any discussion of efficient breach, when applied to marriage,
becomes a discussion of the degree to which marriage continues to re-
quire a lifelong commitment and of the impact on children if it does
not. When couples divorce, their separation may exact a higher finan-
remedy is ideal, whereas with respect to reliance, the restitution remedy is ideal. Thus, which
remedy is best overall depends on whether the breach decision or the reliance decision is more
important in terms of efficiency.
M. POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 36.
103. Ellman, supra note 4, at 47-48, 50-51.
104. Although Ellman purports to be concerned with utility maximization rather than in-
come maximization, see id. at 50-51, his decision to limit compensation to "financially rational
sharing behavior" belies that claim. Id. at 58, 63; see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
His claim also is questionable because in setting forth his theory of alimony, his prime attention is
focused on explaining why the lower earning spouse, i.e., the wife, should forego her career pros-
pects in order to ensure that her husband can fully realize his, when virtually all other economists
concerned with specialization and utility maximization concentrate on the trade-offs necessary to
accommodate childrearing, not dual-career families. It is instructive that Elbman devotes only 3 of
81 pages to childrearing. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 71-74; cf. G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 14-15;
Landes, supra note 13, at 35.
105. The only interest Ellman recognizes in having spouses pursue similar roles, rather than
having the wife specialize in domestic chores, is her psychic satisfaction in having her husband
perform more housework. Elhnan, supra note 4, at 48 n.140. Missing altogether from Ellman's
analysis is the fact that many women prefer their jobs to remaining at home, that society accords
greater prestige to paid employment, and that economic independence has a dramatic effect on the
power relationships within marriage and on women's status within society generally. See Brown,
Home Production for Use in a Market Economy, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY. SomE FEMINIST QUES-
TIONS 164 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982); V. FuCHS, supra note 89, at 67-73; Kay, supra note 2,
at 85-86; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 831 (1989).
106. Other writers of the law and economics school address the issue primarily in terms of
childrearing, not income maximization. See sources cited supra note 104; see also Brown, supra
note 105, at 154-56.
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cial and emotional toll on their children and on the society that has to
deal with their children than it does on the couple themselves. 107 More-
over, to the extent that higher divorce rates lead to less specialization
within marriage, the primary consequence is fewer children, not lower
income. The consequences of fewer children, positive and negative,
transcend the value that their parents place on childrearing. 08 Any dis-
cussion of divorce policy, therefore, must consider a broader array of
interests than simply the couple's desire to maximize their income.
Similarly, any discussion of surplus enhancing reliance will turn on
the desired balance between women's work force participation and their
retention of the primary childrearing role. Consideration of women's
work force participation solely in terms of maximization of the couple's
income, or even utility, misstates the issue both in efficiency and fair-
ness terms. Ellman, much like Gary Becker before him,'09 presents the
issue in terms of a choice between specialization in the market and the
home or a sharing of domestic tasks. He concludes that:
In the end, marital "specialization" makes sense for most couples, with one
spouse concentrating more heavily on the market while the other focuses more
heavily on domestic matters. If the spouses view their marriage as a sharing enter-
prise, they will usually conclude that they are both better off if the lower earning
spouse spends more on their joint domestic needs, and allows the higher earning
spouse to maximize his or her income.110
Specialization, however, is not a two-party affair. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, specialization meant that married middle-class women did not
work outside the home after marriage and the husband's role in chil-
drearing was virtually eliminated."' In the late twentieth century, spe-
cialization involves women specializing among themselves to provide
childcare so that many mothers work outside the home, entrusting care
107. See A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 74, 79 (1981); J. WALLERSTEIN & J.
KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 206-34 (1980);
Furstenberg, The Life Course of Children of Divorce, 48 Am. Soc. REv. 667 (Oct. 1983).
108. See P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 74-83; V. FUCHS, supra note 89, at 104,
107; Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents; Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
109. G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 14-32. Becker originated the use of economic analysis as a
basis for promoting specialization within the family. Curiously, though, Ellman does not cite
Becker, relying instead on the works of Elisabeth Landes and Lloyd Cohen. See Ellman, supra
note 4, at 41 n.128, 42 n.130; see also Cohen, supra note 108, at 295; Landes, supra note 13.
Landes, however, worked directly with Becker and was strongly influenced by his conclusions. See
Landes, supra note 13, at 35-39. Cohen also cites Becker, although his work focuses less on the
importance of specialization. See G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 291 n.54, 296 n.63.
110. Ellman, supra note 4, at 48.
111. For a discussion of the "cult of true womanhood" and other nineteenth century develop-
ments, see N. Co'rr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835
(1977); Thorne, Feminist Rethinking of the Family: An Overview, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY:
SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 7 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982); Welter, The Cult of True Wo-
manhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966); Williams, supra note 105, at 806-13.
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of their children to other women paid for caring for more children than
just their own.' 12 The same arguments that justify specialization be-
tween men and women justify specialization among women, and some
men, in the provision of childcare. Yet, the incentives necessary to en-
courage specialization within the home may inhibit specialization
among women in providing childcare."
The problem is compounded because incentives encouraging spe-
cialization within the home may perpetuate existing patterns of dis-
crimination in employment and in the socialization of boys and girls.
Girls, encouraged from birth to specialize in the home, tend to invest
less in their own education and in the acquisition of skills marketable in
the workplace." 4 Employers, accustomed to the idea, whether borne out
by empirical evidence or not, that women workers are more likely than
men to place family ahead of job, pay women less and are less likely to
hire them for the positions that offer the greatest opportunities for ad-
vancement." 5 Women are most likely to be the lower earning spouse in
a marriage because they historically have been primarily responsible for
childcare. Yet Ellman argues, in effect, that women should bear the pri-
mary responsibility for childcare because they cannot earn as much as
their husbands. A rational divorce policy necessarily entails a choice
about whether to perpetuate or dismantle the existing gender-based di-
vision of marital responsibilities."' A conclusion that the lower earning
112. See P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 147-77; V. FUCHS, supra note 89 passim;
Brown, supra note 105, at 151-67; Williams, supra note 105, at 832.
113. This is particularly true if the issue is viewed not only in terms of economic incentives
necessary to encourage women's work force participation, but also in terms of ideological changes
necessary to encourage women to look to their careers rather than to marriage as their primary
source of financial security, to make the investments in education, training, and experience neces-
sary to realize their earning potential, and to empower women to challenge the obstacles to their
success. See Kay, supra note 2, at 80, 85-86; Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1567-78 (1983); Williams, supra note 105, at
831-32.
114. G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 24-27; P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 153-59;
V. FUCHS, supra note 89, at 49-56.
115. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 159-68; V. FUCHS, supra note 89, at 32-57;
see also Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989); Williams, supra
note 105, at 822-30.
116. Gary Becker, while making an argument for specialization almost identical to Elhnan's,
argues explicitly that women should specialize in the home and men in the market for biological
reasons. G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 21-29; cf. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 88-89.
In contrast, many feminists emphasize the close connection between the ideology of the modern
nuclear family with a particular sexual division of labor and the oppression of women. See, e.g.,
Thorne, supra note 111, at 13; see also Kay, supra note 2, at 80 (stating that we should not en-
courage future couples entering marriage to make decisions that will be economically disabling for
women and thus continue their traditional economic dependence upon men and their inequality at
divorce); Williams, supra note 105, at 845.
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spouse should be the one to specialize in the home because she earns
less begs the question.
The choice between expectation and restitution accordingly rests
on more than the ability of married couples to maximize their incomes
within the existing social framework. Any comprehensive divorce theory
must take into account externalities such as the importance that society
places on children, married women's participation in the work force,
and a greater degree of sexual equality. Ellman, therefore, correctly
concludes that a modern theory of alimony should be a noncontractual
one. His failure to consider interests that transcend those of the parties
to the marriage, however, means that his theory necessarily fails to pro-
vide a comprehensive basis for the proposals he advocates. 117
C. The Normative Implications of The Theory of Alimony
Ellman's analysis does not acknowledge the tension between effi-
cient breach and efficient reliance, and between advancing a couple's
interests within society as it now exists and the societal interest in pro-
viding for a different future. His theory, dependent as it is on the neu-
tral-sounding language of efficiency, fails to provide a basis for choosing
between those concerns. Ellman does make a choice, however, and his
choice of restitution over reliance or expectation is defensible only to
the extent that overreliance presents a bigger risk than inefficient
breach.11 8
Translated into ordinary English, concern about inefficient breach
becomes an argument that the divorce rate is too high and that the
party responsible for the breakup of the marriage should bear the costs
that the divorce imposes on the other party." 9 Imposing this obligation
should deter divorce when the costs of the breakup exceed the benefits
and should vindicate the reliance the parties have placed on the mar-
riage.2 0 It also would reinforce traditional sexual stereotypes.'2 '
Historically, women have enjoyed greater opportunities to enhance
their standards of living by marrying well rather than by developing
their own careers.2 2 Women, therefore, have invested less than men in
education and training, and they have been more willing than their hus-
117. Ellman's failure to consider interests that go beyond those of the couple also means that
his theory, as it stands, is a contractual one, his claims to the contrary notwithstanding. See supra
notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
120. See Kv POLINSKY, supra note 9, at 29-32; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1463;
Ellman, supra note 4, at 50.
121. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text; see also Landes, supra note 13.
122. See M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 31-32.
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bands to interrupt or forego promising employment opportunities. 123
Indeed, until recently the ability to forego employment outside the
home enhanced a woman's social standing. The mothers of young chil-
dren were encouraged to stay home if they possibly could.124 Cultural
and social stereotypes celebrated the dichotomy between home and
market, and sexual discrimination limited the return women could ex-
pect from their forays into the market.1
25
Before the no-fault revolution, divorce law reinforced these social
mores. The law sought to deter not only inefficient breach, but all di-
vorce, even in cases in which both parties agreed that they would be
better off apart. 21 With divorce rare, expectation and reliance coin-
cided; and overreliance, the possibility that women could devote too
much of their energies to the home, was unthinkable. 12 Symbolically
and practically, women were encouraged to look to marriage for their
primary sources of economic well-being.
128
The elimination of fault as a prerequisite for divorce occurred con-
temporaneously with the large-scale entry of married middle-class
women into the labor market.129 While the elimination of fault as a pre-
requisite for divorce did not necessarily mean that the reasons for the
divorce were irrelevant to the financial determinations to be made,
many states followed California's lead and abolished consideration of
marital conduct altogether. 130 Spousal support was to be awarded on
the basis of need, a standard interpreted to provide relatively short-
term awards designed to do little more than ease the transition from
married life.' The modern need standard not only fell short of pro-
tecting the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage; it also failed
to guarantee the return of an appropriate share of the benefits the other
123. See supra text accompanying note 114.
124. See Williams, supra note 105, at 832 and sources cited at n.152.
125. N. Corr, supra note 111, at 67-68; Olsen, supra note 113; Williams, supra note 105, at
811-12.
126. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 860-64, 870.
127. See N. Corr, supra note 111, at 67-68, 73 and sources cited at nn.197-206; Olsen, supra
note 113, at 1499-1500; Williams, supra note 105, at 811-12.
128. Until recently, young women planning to marry were encouraged, either expressly by
their future husbands or implicitly by the entire culture in which they had grown up, that they did
not need to develop any special skills or abilities beyond those necessary for homemaking and
childcare because their husbands would provide their financial support and security. See Grove v.
Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571 P.2d 477, 485 (1977). Cohen observes that "[t]he fact that, unlike
their grandmother, my daughters will not be told that in order 'to change diapers you don't need a
college degree' is at least in part a reflection of the fact that their job changing diapers will be less
secure than was their grandmother's." Cohen, supra note 108, at 295 n.62.
129. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAs, supra note 80, at 147-52; Williams, supra note 105, at 832.
130. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 887-88 n.132; Kay, supra note 2, at 72-74 n.363.
131. See generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1; see also Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at
889 n.137 and sources cited therein.
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spouse retained after the divorce. 132 The new system does not recognize
expectation, reliance, or restitution.
With neither moral stigma nor financial disincentives to deter di-
vorce, divorce rates soared.133 With high divorce rates and minimal fi-
nancial protection in the event of divorce, women no longer could be
assured of marriage as a lifelong source of financial security.3  Fewer
marriages occurred, middle-class women who did marry had fewer chil-
dren, and even the mothers of small children were more likely to re-
main in the labor force.'35 The new system effectively encouraged
divorce, whether efficient or not, and discouraged reliance, whether effi-
cient or not.136 Women who failed to pursue careers or who sacrificed
their opportunities for their families did so at their peril.137
Restitution provides a way to acknowledge the contributions mar-
ried women are continuing to make to childrearing and the accommoda-
tions inevitable in two-career families without a return to a system of
lifelong separation of home and market. 38 Under a restitution system,
at least one designed along the lines set forth in The Theory of Ali-
mony, the prototypical award will go to a woman who interrupts a
promising career to care for her children. The woman who fails to de-
velop her earning potential before the children are born or her hus-
band's transfer takes effect, the woman without children who marries a
man with an established career, and the man who marries a higher
earning woman will remain financially at risk from divorce.13 9
A restitution system, unlike one based on expectation or reliance,
encourages women to look to their own earnings rather than to mar-
riage for their financial security. Reliance on marriage that does not
result in gains that survive the divorce will remain unprotected. But
unlike the present need-based system, a restitution theory of alimony
also will encourage women to continue to bear the primary responsibil-
ity for childrearing and to make sacrifices that will enhance their hus-
bands' careers. The normative basis of The Theory of Alimony rests on
a conclusion that overreliance on marriage is a greater risk than ineffi-
132. Ellman, supra note 4, at 3-4, 52, 55.
133. See P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 80, at 59-65; Williams, supra note 105, at 824.
134. See generally L. WEiTZMAN, supra note 1, at 337-56; Williams, supra note 105, at 824-27
and sources cited at n.119.
135. See supra note 108 and authorities cited therein; see also Williams, supra note 105, at
824 n.109, 832 n.149.
136. Ellman, supra note 4, at 49-50.
137. See supra text accompanying note 132; see also Kay, supra note 2, at 80.
138. See Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY:
SoME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 125 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982).
139. Ellman, supra note 4, at 73. Of course, restitution principles could be used without Ell-
man's insistence on individualized proof of earning loss. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying
text.
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cient divorce, but to the extent women's contributions produce gains
that survive the marriage-children, medical degrees, the other person's
enhanced career-they should be protected and encouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
Ellman's The Theory of Alimony rests on the unsatisfying conclu-
sion that divorce law should deter divorce and encourage specialization,
but that the remedies that would best advance those objectives must be
rejected because of the difficulty of establishing responsibility for the
divorce.1 40 The real issue turns on something more than the indetermi-
nacy of marital obligations in the modern era. To begin with, Ellman's
claim that changing social mores make it impossible either to define
marital obligations or to determine if they have been breached must be
subject to greater scrutiny.141 Nineteenth century judges displayed little
hesitation in judging marital conduct amidst the changing social mores
of those times,'142 and modern judges in the states that permit consider-
ation of marital misconduct to continue to influence financial awards
similarly demonstrate their ability to reach principled conclusions.1 43
The issue is not so much whether such determinations are possible as
whether they are worth the effort.14 4
140. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 13-40.
141. Susan Westerbrook Prager observes:
One question that needs greater exploration is whether it is appropriate to discard the
concept of responsibility in divorce law. Certainly we would not want fault in its previous
incarnation, which focused on isolated selected behavior such as adultery and acts thought to
be cruel. Yet perhaps the fact that often one person wants to continue the marriage ought to
be relevant to considerations of property division and spousal support. The difficulty in ad-
dressing this question is whether some greater fairness based upon expectations can be estab-
lished without reintroducing the evils of the earlier fault-based law. One way to reconcile
these goals is to retain the concept of divorce at the option of one partner but emphasize that
there may well be continuing responsibility based not simply on the agreement to marry but
on actual reliance during the ongoing marriage.
Prager, supra note 138, at 125-26.
142. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 4 Greene 26 (Iowa 1853); Peckford v. Peckford, 1 Paige Ch.
274 (N.Y. Ch. 1828); Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. 747 (1819). For a particu-
larly insightful discussion of the role of changing social mores in the determination of divorce
decisions, see Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth Century Massa-
chusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586 (1976).
143. Fault fell into disrepute not because it became indeterminate, but because it became
irrelevant to the permissibility of divorce. Its role in the financial dispositions made upon divorce
has never really been examined independently of its role as a prerequisite for divorce. See Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 4, at 867, 883-84, 896-98.
144. Ellman's primary argument is that breach of marital obligations cannot be a basis for
financial decisions because such obligations are too difficult to determine, and he gives several
examples of "hard cases." See Ellman, supra note 4, at 19. It is not impossible, however, to imag-
ine a divorce system in which proof that marital obligations have been breached is irrelevant to the
granting of the divorce, but allowed as a basis for adjustment to the financial allocations made.
Under such a system, the party seeking to benefit from the showing of breach would have the
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Because Ellman dismisses the possibility of such an inquiry from
the outset, we do not know whether he would conclude that the inter-
ests he identifies-deterring divorce and encouraging specializa-
tion-would be worth the cost. 145 It is possible, however, that even if
Ellman conceded that marital obligations could be determined with
some certainty and that the costs of such an inquiry were manageable,
he still would conclude that his restitution proposals are preferable. Al-
though Ellman and the writers from whom he draws his inspiration em-
brace specialization, there is no reason to believe that they would
endorse greater specialization within the family at the expense of
greater specialization among women.146 The modern challenge, as Fran
Olsen argues, is to transcend the dichotomy between home and market,
support women in their efforts to participate in the labor force, and
contribute to the care of their families. 47 Restitution accomplishes
those goals better than does expectation, both in terms of fairness and
efficiency. 48
Ellman, moreover, should favor expectation remedies tied to a de-
termination of marital misconduct, even if he were to conclude that
these remedies would better serve the interests of efficiency. Tying the
financial consequences of divorce to a finding of marital misconduct
would have a dramatically greater impact on the lower earning spouse,
and the whole point of specialization is to ensure that women remain
the lower earning spouses.149 A 100,000 dollar a year husband married
to a wife able to earn 15,000 dollars a year on her own may be able to
afford a substantial alimony award as the price for initiating a divorce,
while his wife may face virtual impoverishment for making the same
decision. Her problems will be compounded if she hopes to have cus-
tody of the children and needs to consider their financial well-being in
addition to her own. Even if marital misconduct were defined in a way
burden of proof. If that burden could not be met because the obligations were uncertain, as they
are in Ellman's hard cases, then the court could deny a financial adjustment in those cases while
still awarding the restitution-type award Eliman recommends. For a discussion of how this might
work, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at 886-87, 899-902.
145. Ellman does acknowledge, however, that claims based on lost marriage prospects may
have to be addressed. Ellman, supra note 4, at 80-81.
146. See authorities cited supra note 109.
147. Olsen, supra note 113, at 1560-78; see also Fineman, supra note 3, at 814-20; Kay, supra
note 2, at 80; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 506-08.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39; infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
149. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (concluding that the effect of continuing
societal support for specialization within the family will be to perpetuate the existing gender divi-
sion of responsibility); see also G. BECKER, supra note 77, at 21-29 (arguing that specialization
within the family necessarily involves women specializing within the home); cf. Kay, supra note 2,
at 80 (arguing that specialization may perpetuate traditional financial dependence upon men and
contribute to the inequality of women at divorce).
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that, on average, increased alimony awards for women, as long as they
earned less than their husbands, women still would have more to lose
from such a determination than men. The result would be an adverse
impact on women's bargaining positions within many marriages.150 A
restitution system, however, particularly one that guaranteed a com-
fortable settlement to most women otherwise dependent on their hus-
bands' incomes, would impose a lesser price for a lower earning spouse's
decision to end the marriage and would enhance her bargaining power
in an ongoing marriage. 15
Even if Ellman were to undertake a rigorous comparison of expec-
tation, reliance, and restitution remedies, there is no reason to believe
that he would change his conclusions. Expectation and reliance meas-
ures are likely to remain unattractive because they require a determina-
tion that marital obligations have been breached, and the purposes such
a determination would serve are questionable in themselves and most
likely are not worth the costs that an inquiry into marital conduct
150. Determination of the effect on bargaining power requires a comparison of the different
systems and the relative positions of the parties. In a need-based system in which awards generally
are low, the party with the least bargaining power within the marriage will be dependent on the
other spouse's income. If the higher earning spouse threatens to leave, has flagrant affairs, or phys-
ically or psychologically abuses the other spouse, the lower earning spouse will have little recourse.
A divorce, irrespective of which party initiates it or which is at fault, will be a financial disaster.
See generally L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1.
A system that ties expectation awards to findings of marital misconduct will give the finan-
cially dependent spouse relatively more bargaining power as, most likely, she can threaten divorce
in response to the higher earning spouse's misdeeds. It leaves the dependent spouse vulnerable,
however, if she wishes to leave, or threatens to leave, in the face of less clearly egregious conduct
by her mate. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
A restitution system that guarantees a comfortable level of support irrespective of the reasons
for the divorce gives the lower earning spouse significantly more ability to end, or threaten to end,
an unhappy marriage. Indeed, the higher the likely award, the greater the financial penalty divorce
will impose on the higher earning spouse, enhancing the lower earning spouse's position generally.
For a discussion of the effect of such a rule on divorce rates, see Brinig & Carbone, supra note 4, at
899 n.173. Proposals to equalize standards of living for some period after the marriage will have
similar effects on bargaining power. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 61, at 1117-20. Such a system may
make marriage less attractive for higher earning individuals or may encourage them to enter into
antenuptial agreements. To the extent the parties' positions are financially comparable during the
marriage, alimony laws will have less of an impact on their respective positions. Consideration of
marital misconduct still will have an impact on the party wishing to leave, but that impact will be
closer to gender neutral.
These effects would soften somewhat if the different systems were combined. For example, in
a system of expectation damages tied to a determination of breach of marital obligations, there
still could be restitution or need-based awards to the party found to be in breach. See Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 4, at 901-02. A lower earning spouse would be less disadvantaged by the
decision to end the marriage if guaranteed a certain level of support.
151. For a discussion of the impact of divorce rules on bargaining power, see Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 150, at 950 and V. FuCHS, supra note 89, at 71-72.
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would impose on the judicial system.152 Given these conclusions, restitu-
tion offers an attractive alternative to the present need-based system,
and Ellman has performed a valuable service in working through the
details of this system.
As a restitution system, the major limitation of his proposals is the
one Ellman acknowledges-that restitution awards require difficult cal-
culation of lost earning potential."' In insisting on precise calculations,
however, Ellman falls into a trap. Once he identifies lost earning poten-
tial as the basis for his theory of alimony, he concludes that alimony
awards, like any other award of restitution damages, must be based on
specific proof of loss in individual cases.1 54 The result is a system that
appears to be designed with only young urban professionals in mind.
Well-educated women who postpone marriage and childbearing until
they have started up the corporate ladder, or at least graduated from
law school, can point with some certainty to the opportunities they
forewent when they had children or left Wall Street to follow their hus-
bands to the hinterlands. Women who marry at eighteen or who follow
a sporadic pattern of labor market participation will be unable to point
to specific proof of loss, although they, too, may have sacrificed some
earning potential for their husbands and children.'55 Because individu-
alized proof of earning loss will be impossible for many women to pro-
duce, the courts will be faced with a choice of surreptitiously
circumventing these requirements or imposing even greater hardships
on many women than does the current need-based system. Ellman's
proposals, even if theoretically sound, may be impossible to implement.
An examination of existing judicial methods and other proposals in
this area offers some alternatives. First, need and restitution are not
two mutually exclusive alternatives. Ellman's analysis focuses only on
152. For a discussion of the costs of determining marital misconduct, see Brinig & Carbone,
supra note 4, at 896 nn.158-59 and the sources cited therein.
153. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 78-80.
154. Ellman relies on analogies to the determinations made in tort cases in which statistical
evidence is used widely. Id. at 78-79. He mentions that "the gap between men and women is
largely a product of women's larger share of parental responsibilities," but does not explain how
that is to be taken into account. Id. at 79 n.187. Under EUman's proposals, the courts will need to
determine the particular earnings a lower earning spouse lost because of her child care responsibil-
ities, but data on women's earnings generally, which are already reduced because of their child care
responsibilities, presumably are meaningless.
155. See id. at 78. Of course, to the extent The Theory of Alimony is designed to discourage
reliance on marriage, this may be intentional. See supra text following note 139. Women with
established careers are the only ones certain of protection in this system. Women who fail to de-
velop their earning potential do so at their peril.
To the extent that Ellman is serious about specialization, however, the result is curious. Many
women have better opportunities for marriage than for employment. Why encourage these women
to invest in their careers if they are to be encouraged to abandon them later?
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the obligation of one spouse to another. An argument can be made,
however, that a married couple has an obligation to society to see that
the other party to the marriage is provided for before a divorce is
granted.156 Need, therefore, could serve as a residual category establish-
ing a floor below which support will be not be allowed to fall.
Second, the burden of proof could be adjusted to facilitate such
awards. In Oregon the courts assume that, but for their reliance on
marriage, women would be able to enjoy a standard of living commen-
surate with that provided by the marriage.157 Professors Jana Singer
and Stephen Sugarman, writing separately, eschew any pretense of pre-
cision in making such awards, advocating instead that income, like
property, be equalized for a period after the divorce.'58 While all of
these proposals can be justified by the need to compensate for lost
earning potential, they trade unattainable precision for certain and eas-
156. For example, suppose an electrician marries a hospital administrator. Her career flour-
ishes. He is disabled by diabetes. He will have suffered no loss of earning potential due to the
marriage, but if he lacks disability insurance, he may become dependent on welfare or other bene-
fits if she does not support him. There is arguably a societal interest, independent of the relation-
ship between the two parties, in ensuring that the divorce does not result in placing an added
burden on societal resources. For a discussion of the need standard, see L. WEiTZMAN, supra note 1.
For a discussion of the role of need in property divisions, see Reynolds, The Relationship of Prop-
erty Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 827
(1988). Ellman, too, acknowledges need as a societal obligation, but, by that, means that society,
not the former spouse, must provide it. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 52.
157. See, e.g., Grove v. Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571 P.2d 477, 485 (1977); In re Marriage
of Yantis, 52 Or. App. 825, 629 P.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Stiff v. Stiff, 395 So. 2d 573, 574
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
In Stiff, 395 So. 2d at 574, a labor market analyst appearing for the husband testified that had
the wife gone to work 25 years previously and been good in her career, she would have been mak-
ing about $17,000 per year at the time of the divorce. The court, however, concluded that the wife
needed $25,000 per year to maintain her current standard of living and that her husband, who
earned $87,200 per year at that time, could afford to pay that amount. Id. While the Stiff court did
not use the restitution standard Ellman advocates here, the case illustrates the pitfalls. If the court
had focused solely on the issue of what the wife would have earned had she not married, the labor
market analyst's testimony might have been compelling. But the $17,000 figure almost certainly
reflects the fact that women earn less than men, that they are more likely to choose lower paying
occupations, and that they are less likely to invest in their own education and training-all be-
cause women are more likely than men to rely on marriage. As the Grove court explained:
[Alt least until recent years, young women entering marriage were led to believe-if not ex-
pressly by their husbands-to-be, certainly implicitly by the entire culture in which they had
come to maturity-that they need not develop any special skills or abilities beyond those
necessary to homemaking and child care, because their husbands, if they married, would pro-
vide their financial support and security. We cannot hold that women who relied on that
assurance, regardless of whether they sacrificed any specific career plans of their own when
they married, must as a matter of principle be limited to the standard of living they can
provide for themselves if "employed at a job commensurate with [their] skills and abilities."
The marriage itself may well have prevented the development of those skills and abilities.
Grove, 280 Or. at 351-52, 571 P.2d at 485.
158. See Singer, supra note 61, at 1117; Sugarman, supra note 61.
1498
1990] ECONOMICS, FEMINISM, AND ALIMONY 1499
ily administered awards."' 9
In deciding whether these trade-offs are worthwhile, indeed, in fi-
nally deciding whether restitution, as opposed to expectation, reliance,
need, or some other standard, offers a comprehensive basis for alimony,
the role of marriage in modern society must be examined with some
rigor. Ellman has made a useful start in exploring the trade-offs mar-
ried couples make in arranging their affairs and the interest society has
in encouraging them to continue to do so. To reach any final conclu-
sions in articulating a truly comprehensive theory, alimony, as EUman
acknowledges, cannot be examined in isolation.16 0 In the future, the role
of marriage will be defined in terms of gender justice and provision for
children, as well as in terms of the couple's economic relationship.' 6'
The incentives that alimony provides will be determined only in con-
junction with the incentives supplied by property divisions and child
support."2
On The Theory of Alimony's own terms, moreover, it is impossible
to critique alternative proposals without clarifying the contradictions at
the core of the analysis. If Ellman is serious about deterring divorce,
the logic of his position suggests that he should consider a system of
expectation damages. If his primary concern is encouraging specializa-
tion within marriage, his insistence on individualized proof will be
counterproductive. 6 3 If, as suggested, Ellman is more concerned with
159. The Oregon courts expressly base their standard on the need to compensate for lost
earning potential. See, e.g., Grove v. Grove, 280 Or. 341, 571 P.2d 477 (1977). Sugarman argues,
instead, that the spouse's interests merge over time, see Sugarman, supra note 61, at 61-63, and
Singer relies on the extension of partnership principles. Singer, supra note 61, at 1117-18. None-
theless, the Singer and Sugarman proposals also could be justified as surrogates for the inherently
uncertain calculations Ellman proposes. Singer states:
The requirement of post-divorce income sharing is designed to equalize the financial conse-
quences of these gender-linked marital investment decisions. The income-sharing requirement
thus compensates both traditional homemakers and the much larger percentage of divorcing
women who have held both domestic and market jobs and whose investments in their families
and in their husbands' careers have enhanced their husbands' earning power at the expense of
their own.
Id. at 1118.
160. Ellman observes:
[A] comprehensive examination of existing law would have to consider the division of marital
property as well. There is a link between spousal claims for alimony and those for a share in
the property accumulated during the marriage: both are financial claims against one's former
spouse based on the spousal relationship, and are in that sense fungible. A complete prescrip-
tion for a revision of the law therefore requires a theory of property division as well as a
theory of alimony.
Ellman, supra note 4, at 12.
161. See text accompanying notes 116-17.
162. See supra note 160.
163. See Prager, supra note 138, at 121 (stating that the establishment of dependency rela-
tionships can be discouraged through an absence of sharing principles).
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deterring overreliance on marriage, he should reject the Singer and
Sugarman proposals and give serious attention to Herma Hill Kay's en-
dorsement, albeit qualified, of the existing need-based system.1' 4 To
justify the particular form of restitution he has advanced, Ellman will
have to go beyond The Theory of Alimony and explain how specializa-
tion within the home will coexist with market specialization among
both men and women in the marriages of the future.165
Finally, Ellman's proposals would be strengthened if he recognized
the restitutional nature of his proposals outright. Feminist writers have
decried the poverty of the existing debate focusing on "woman as
equal" and presumably, therefore, able to proceed on her own after a
divorce, or "woman as victim," damaged by her failure to conform to
the male model of full work force participation. 6 6 Feminist writers ar-
gue that a woman-centered perspective is missing. Such a perspective
would include a view of marriage in which financial and nonfinancial
contributions are equally valued, in which women's decisions on how to
combine labor force participation with care for their families are viewed
not as defective versions of the male model, but as valuable in their own
right.117 By focusing on the benefits rather than the debits of marriage,
restitution offers the possibility of a different approach in symbolic as
well as monetary terms. Under a true restitution system, alimony as a
continuation of the guilty husband's duty of support, as a form of wel-
fare for needy spouses, even as damages for injury inflicted or reliance
misplaced168 would disappear. 169 In its place would be a reaffirmation of
164. See Kay, supra note 2, at 85; see also Thorne, supra note 111, at 13.
165. A complete explanation must examine the issue both in terms of efficiency, that is,
which combination will maximize utility, and fairness, which combination will allow both men and
women to develop fully satisfying and valued roles.
If Ellman is able to clarify his position on these issues, he also will be in a better position to
establish guidelines for the calculations to be made. Given the inherently imprecise nature of the
calculations, he needs to decide whether he is more concerned about a standard that overcompen-
sates or one that undercompensates. If his primary desire is to deter divorce and encourage spe-
cialization, he should favor a broader standard, such as the one suggested by the Oregon courts,
and relax his insistence on individualized proof of earning loss. See supra note 157. If, on the other
hand, Ellman is more interested in encouraging married women to remain in the work force, his
insistence on proof of loss will be more appropriate.
166. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3, at 789; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 498-500.
167. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 500; see also Williams, supra note 105, at 830-31.
168. Ellman, in attempting to use lost earning capacity as a comprehensive basis for alimony,
embraces what Fineman and O'Connell describe as a "woman as victim" approach. See Ellman,
supra note 4, at 40-48; Fineman, supra note 3, at 789; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 500.
169. Calculated in this way, the terms "alimony," "spousal support," and "maintenance" all
should disappear, leaving only the division of property, separated, perhaps, into lump sum and
periodic awards for tax purposes. See H. CLARK, supra note 17, § 14.12.
Moreover, the terms need, spousal support, and maintenance should disappear because they
are at least as offensive and outdated as the term alimony. These words suggest that divorce
awards separate from the division of property are a form of welfare, justified by the dependence of
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both spouses' obligations to contribute to the benefits that the marriage
made possible. Those benefits-children and, to a lesser degree, en-
hanced earning capacity or lifestyle-often will be intangible, and a
substitute calculation such as the one Ellman proposes often will be
appropriate. Nonetheless, recognizing that the benefit conferred and re-
tained after the divorce gives rise to the obligation will place divorce
payments on a different footing. Such awards will be obligations, not
charity, installment payments for benefits retained, not punishment
and not antiquated remnants of an otherwise severed relationship. Rec-
ognition that the obligation arises from the intangible benefit, rather
than from the more quantifiable sacrifice, also will eliminate any illu-
sion of certainty. The inability to achieve precise calculations should
not stand in the way of substantial justice.
one spouse on the earning capacity of the other. Any new proposal, whether it embraces restitution
or partnership as its rationale, should recognize such payments as obligations, not charity.
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